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WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT STRUGGLES OVER NEOLIBERAL 
REFORMS? 
 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE CONTENTIOUS POLITICS OF STABILIZATION 




This PRIF Working Paper reviews and discusses the scholarship on the political economy of macroe-
conomic stabilization and neoliberal structural adjustment, focusing on Latin American experiences 
during the 1980s and early 1990s. It discusses controversies, arguments and findings on a couple of 
key issues: the role of regime type (democratic versus authoritarian) for the adoption and implemen-
tation of economic reforms; the interplay of economic reform struggles and processes of political 
transformation; the relevance of international forces and factors; the role of domestic structures and 
actors; the dynamics of international negotiations over economic reforms; as well as the causes, char-
acteristics and consequences of “IMF riots” and “austerity protests”. The aim of the paper is not to 
present a coherent set of findings but rather to give an overview of a literature that has produced a 
diverse range of insights, ideas and open questions that are helpful to take into consideration when 
studying contemporary dynamics of economic reform struggles. 
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1. INTRODUCTION1 
With the COVID-19 pandemic, a topic has returned with full force on the agenda of academic and 
political debates all around the world that was already quite there well before the coronavirus be-
gan to spread: the question of how to stabilize and, at the same time, structurally transform crisis-
ridden economies. In the 1980s and 1990s, this question was discussed as the quest for macroeco-
nomic stabilization and structural adjustment. At that time, also, a relatively uniform ideological 
framework became hegemonic in guiding this quest: a market- and outward-oriented conception 
of economic development that was dubbed “neoliberalism” and had profound implications also for 
state-society relations and the shape of the global political economy. Whereas the United States 
(under Ronald Reagan) and the United Kingdom (under Margaret Thatcher) played a crucial role 
in this story, the debate about stabilization and structural adjustment was largely confined to what 
was previously called the Third and the Second World. As will be seen in this paper, Latin America 
was a key testing ground, later joined by Eastern Europe, but – generally speaking – all world re-
gions sooner or later became part of the overall trend. Since then, financial crises in individual 
countries (e.g., Mexico 1994/1995, Argentina 2001/2002), entire regions (Southeast Asia 1997, 
Eurozone 2009ff) or at the global level (as with the global financial crisis of 2008/2009) have led, in 
different ways and shapes, to attempts to impose “austerity” – as a short-hand for orthodox macro-
economic stabilization and neoliberal structural adjustment–, but in a few cases also triggered 
experiments with alternative, somehow heterodox responses that go beyond, if not break with, the 
neoliberal orthodoxy. With the pandemic, also a highly controversial actor became, once again, 
very prominent that had played an important – and much discussed – role during the neoliberal 
reforms of 1980s and 1990s: the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
In the more recent cases, as in previous decades, economic reforms have proven far from exercises 
in finding and implementing technical solutions to objective problems. Rather, whether in Latin 
America in the 1980s, in Eastern Europe during the early 1990s, or in the Eurozone after 2009, 
attempts to impose austerity, reform the state and restructure the economy come with fierce politi-
cal controversies and, often, with severe societal conflicts. We are, therefore, dealing here with 
struggles over socioeconomic reforms, which often involve fairly fundamental struggles over basic 
conceptions of development, the economy, the role of the state, and social and economic human 
rights.  
Against this background, the present PRIF Working Paper reviews and discusses key arguments, 
findings, and publications on economic reform struggles during the 1980s and early 1990s. My 
focus is on experiences from Latin America – both because it is a very important region for the 
topic and the scholarship at hand and because it is the region I happen to know best. In addition to 
studies that specifically focus on Latin America, however, also broader, inter- or cross-regional 
comparative research is included (in which Latin America usually also features prominently). The 
overall aim of this working paper is to give a general overview and identify some key debates and 
findings that might be useful to consider when analyzing and debating current developments.  
Most of the research discussed in this working paper belongs to a tradition of comparative histori-
cal studies on the political economy of economic reforms. The modern classics of this line of re-
search include Peter Katzenstein‘s Small States in World Markets and Peter Gourevitch’s Politics in 
Hard Times. Katzenstein (1985) analyzes industrial policy and politico-economic change in small 
Western European states in response to the political and economic crises of the 1930s and 1940s 
                                                 
1 This working paper was prepared in the context, and for the purposes, of the research project “Struggles over socioeco-
nomic reforms: Political conflict and social contention in Egypt and Tunisia post 2011 in interregional comparison”, 
which is generously funded by the Volkswagen Foundation and implemented in cooperation with the Arab Forum for 
Alternatives (Cairo/Beirut) and the University of Sfax. A previous version was presented at a project workshop in Sep-
tember 2020. I thank Nadine Abdalla, Bassem Karray and Irene Weipert-Fenner for helpful comments and Niklas 
Markert for research assistance. 
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(Katzenstein 1985).2 Gourevitch (1986) investigates the responses by the US, the UK, France, Ger-
many and Sweden to the crisis of the world economy in the late 19th century, the 1930s as well as 
during the 1970s and 1980s (Gourevitch 1986).3 At roughly the same time, a first generation of 
studies emerged that started to look at the ways in which countries in the Global South responded 
to the economic crises triggered by the second oil shock in 1979 and the steep rise in US interest 
rates (“Volcker shock”) between 1979 and 1981. This research, initially, tackled the interrelated 
issues of the implementation of IMF programs since the mid-1970s (see Haggard 1985; Remmer 
1986) and responses to the debt crisis of the 1980s (see Kahler 1985; Kaufman 1985), but it quickly 
became broadly focused on the politics, and the political economy, of economic stabilization and 
adjustment (Haggard and Kaufman 1992a; Nelson 1984, 1990a). While this scholarship is of a 
broadly comparative nature and frequently includes case studies from other world regions, too, 
Latin America plays a prominent role – reflecting the fact that this region was most heavily hit by 
the debt crisis and experienced the most significant reform processes during the 1980s (Haggard 
1995: 75–99; Remmer 1998: 13).4 For the same reason, Latin American cases and experiences also 
loom large in comparative studies on “IMF riots” and “austerity protests”, which shift the focus 
from elites and routine politics to the role of the popular sectors and contentious politics in eco-
nomic reform struggles. Looking back at the 1980s, Walton and Shefner (1994: 98) observe that 
Latin America “has provided some of the most spectacular and sustained popular protests against 
structural adjustment programs” and, therefore, “is the logical starting point for our analysis of 
debt-crisis politics and a rich source of hypotheses for comparative evaluation” (see also Auvinen 
1996: 391; Walton 1989: 309). The same observation also holds for later decades (see Almeida and 
Jonston 2006; Eckstein and Wickham-Crowley 2003; Moosa and Moosa 2019: 89–110; Shefner et 
al. 2006; Woodroffe and Ellis-Jones 2000). 
                                                 
2 More specifically, Katzenstein is interested in explaining the different (social versus liberal) types of democratic corpo-
ratism that emerged in the small Western European states (Austria, Norway and Denmark versus Switzerland, the 
Netherlands and Belgium) in response to the multiple crises of the 1930s and 1940s. A key insight from his study is that 
small states/economies, even if they are more heavily influenced by international factors than large industrial states, 
still respond very differently to external pressure: International factors, Katzenstein demonstrates, “affect political 
strategies and outcomes only indirectly: they are funneled through domestic structures that are shaped by different his-
tories and embody different political possibilities” (Katzenstein 1985: 37). 
3 Gourevitch’s approach is “to gain an understanding of the politics of policy choice through a ‘political sociology of 
political economy’ – that is, by looking at the politics of support for different economic policies in response to large 
changes in the international economy” (Gourevitch 1986: 19). His argument: “Economic conditions rarely operate di-
rectly on policy disputes. Other factors mediate them. Those factors include, first, the mechanisms of representation – 
political parties and interest group associations that try to manage the linkage of economic actors to the state. Second, 
politics is affected by the organization of the state itself: the system of rules (electoral laws, balance between legislature 
and executive, legal powers, and so on) and institutions which comprises the bureaucracy. Third, economic actors are 
influenced by ideology which provides models of the economy and of the economic motives of other actors. Finally, 
coalition politics is influenced by a country’s placement in the international state system of political-military rivalries.” 
(Gourevitch 1986: 21) With regard to external (economic) pressure: “[E]ven the small countries, such as Sweden, have 
some leeway. The international system rewards some behaviors, punishes others, yet countries do not automatically 
choose the actions that lead to rewards. Sometimes they tilt the other way and suffer. Meeting the demands of the sys-
tem thus requires explanation. [...] Domestic politics thus matters in the shaping of responses to the international 
economy, even where these responses are intense. The convergence of policy behaviors toward neoclassical approaches 
does not disconfirm this argument: convergence despite partisan variance demonstrates the constraints that the inter-
national economy imposes, but it does so by pressing governments to worry about the same political effects. All gov-
ernments seek some kind of prosperity; all governments have to worry about market confidence. As a consequence all 
governments accept market-induced austerity – the impact of the system on governments passes through politics. The 
international economy presses on individual countries, and it does so through working on domestic actors.” 
(Gourevitch 1986: 235) 
4 For instance, nine of the 13 countries covered by the edited volume Economic Crisis and Policy Choice (Nelson 1990a) 
are from Latin America and the Caribbean. For an overview that covers the literature until the early 1990s, see Haggard 
and Kaufman (1992b: 4–5, footnote 3). When it comes to studies based on an explicitly interregional comparison, 
Grigore Pop-Eleches’ book From Economic Crisis to Reform: IMF Programs in Latin America and Eastern Europe 
(2009) is a key resource. Pop-Eleches analyzes and compares Latin America during the 1980s’ debt crisis with Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union during the post-communist transformation of the 1990s (with an additional snap-
shot on Latin America during the 1990s). More specifically, he combines a cross-country statistical analysis with com-
parative case studies of four countries from each region (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Peru for Latin America, and 
Moldova, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania for Eastern Europe) (Pop-Eleches 2009: 6). 
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In reviewing and discussing the comparative scholarship that looks at struggles over economic 
stabilization and adjustment in the 1980s and early 1990s, in Latin America and beyond, I will 
focus on a couple of key questions that are dealt with throughout the literature: the role of regime 
type (democratic versus authoritarian) for the adoption and implementation of economic reforms 
(2.); the interplay of economic reform struggles and processes of political transformation (3.);the 
(contested) role and relevance of international forces and factors (4.); the domestic structures and 
actors that shape the adoption and implementation of economic stabilization and structural ad-
justment policies (5.); the interplay of all these factors during international processes of negotiation 
(6.); as well as the causes, characteristics and consequences of “IMF riots” and “austerity protests” 
(7.). 
2. ECONOMIC REFORMS UNDER DEMOCRATIC VERSUS AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 
As regards the relevance of regime type, the comparative scholarship emerging in the 1980s quick-
ly demonstrated that the previously held “conventional wisdom” that “authoritarianism is a neces-
sary albeit insufficient condition for successful stabilization” was wrong (Remmer 1986: 3–4).5 
Empirically, the analysis of IMF programs in Latin America (1954–1984) revealed that democratic 
regimes “are not more reluctant to initiate standby programs” (Remmer 1986: 8); that they do not 
“fall victim to stabilization policies more frequently than their authoritarian counterparts” (Rem-
mer 1986: 8); and that they also do not underperform when it comes to the implementation and 
political sustainability of the programs (Remmer 1986: 11).6 Based on a comparative analysis of 
IMF programs in seven countries,7 Haggard concluded that reforms in democratic countries 
proved difficult indeed, resulting in different types of “democratic stalemate” (Jamaica, Mexico, 
and Sri Lanka), but that authoritarianism does not necessarily facilitate stabilization and adjust-
ment reforms either: In fact, both types of low-income authoritarian regimes he looked at – per-
sonalist ones based on narrow, clientelistic elites (Haiti, Zaire) and those depending on broader 
networks of state patronage (Guyana, Sudan) – were found to “present daunting barriers to eco-
nomic adjustment” as well (Haggard 1985: 529).8 
Theoretically, the key argument points to the diversity of both democratic and authoritarian re-
gimes (see Haggard 1990: 45; Haggard and Kaufman 1989: 232–239; Maravall 1995: 17; Nelson 
1990a: 23–24; Remmer 1986: 4).9 While some authoritarian regimes – such as “the ‘strong’ bureau-
cratic-authoritarian regimes in Latin America (Brazil post 1964, Chile post 1973) – may have facili-
tated the top-down imposition of adjustment programs, this does not apply to authoritarian re-
                                                 
5 See also Haggard (1985: 510–511, 1990: 254–270); Haggard and Kaufman (1989: 232–239, 1992b: 32–34); Nelson 
(1990b: 22–24); Diamond and Plattner (1995); Geddes (1995); and Maravall (1995). Regarding the previous view, for 
instance, Thomas Skidmore had argued – based on evidence from Argentina, Brazil and Mexico – that “governments 
in competitive systems find it extremely difficult” to successfully implement anti-inflation measures and, if they do so, 
pay “very high political costs”, given the unpopular consequences that such measures have at least in the short term 
(1977: 181; emphasis in the original). Guillermo O’Donnell’s analysis of bureaucratic authoritarianism in Latin Ameri-
ca implies a roughly similar logic (see Collier 1979). For the overall rationale behind the notion of an “authoritarian ad-
vantage”, see the summary in Maravall (1995: 13–15). 
6  Given her finding of a generally low implementation record of IMF programs (which holds for both democratic and 
authoritarian regimes), Remmer (1986: 10) hypothesized “that standby arrangements have not caused more regime in-
stability because the risky cures recommended by the IMF simply have not been administered”. Such an argument, 
however, could no longer be maintained later, when the capacity of democratic regime to implement even drastic stabi-
lization and structural adjustment programs became undeniable (see below). 
7  Jamaica, Guyana, Haiti, Mexico, Sri Lanka, and Mexico. 
8 “Market-oriented policies have been successfully pursued by a wide variety of different regimes: military, as in post-
1973 Chile; one-party, as in post-1985 Mexico; and democratic, as in post-1985 Bolivia.” (Remmer 1998: 8) 
9 As Remmer (1986: 4) has argued, the “chief question mark about the theoretical linkage between authoritarianism and 
stabilization” has to do “with the explanatory power of the regime variable”: “Virtually by definition the process of pol-
icy formation varies with regime type, but other influences on policy outputs and outcomes are so numerous and the 
phenomena embraced by broad regime categories such as ‘democracy’ so diverse that there is reason to question 
whether regime per se actually has any significant impact on the political sustainability of stabilization programs. The 
willingness and ability of governments to implement stabilization policies may depend instead on other factors.” (On 
these factors, see Section 5). 
5 
 
PRIF Working Paper No. 51 
gimes in which state patronage is “a central pillar of political authority and legitimation” (Haggard 
1985: 510–511).10 By contrast, “the greater legitimacy and popular support typically enjoyed by 
democratic regimes” can be assumed to “increase the appeal of programs calling for short-term 
sacrifice on behalf of the nation as a whole (Remmer 1986: 3; see also Maravall1995: 15). This 
should be particularly the case when predecessor governments have openly failed, when the elec-
toral opposition is weak, and when antidemocratic forces are discredited or weak (Haggard 1985: 
511). Furthermore, also in democracies, functioning corporatist structures “can guarantee mutual 
restraint and efficient decision making”, while mitigating “the collective-action dilemmas that 
characterize state-labor and labor-management relations by institutionalizing bargaining and 
changing the rate at which labor discounts future advantages from sustained cooperation” (Hag-
gard 1990: 267; see also Katzenstein 1985).11 
Similarly criticizing “the crude authoritarian-democratic distinction”, Joan Nelson (1990b: 24) 
argues that “a combination of regime type and support base may be more helpful than either vari-
able taken separately”: 
“Thus established or transitional democratic systems that depend on business (and some-
times also on military groups) may behave in some ways like similarly based authoritarian 
systems, although they are unlikely to be as repressive. Conversely, authoritarian regimes 
that draw a substantial degree of support from popular forces (including though not neces-
sarily confined to organized labor) may respond to adjustment pressures somewhat like 
similarly based transitional or established democracies.” (Nelson 1990b: 24) 
Over the years, the finding that democratic regimes can indeed be able to adopt and implement 
even far-reaching structural adjustment programs was only further confirmed (Geddes 1995: 60–
63; see also Diamond and Plattner 1995; Haggard and Webb 1994a; Pop-Eleches 2009; Remmer 
1998; Weyland 2002). The most notable Latin American cases include Bolivia (after 1985) and 
Argentina (after 1989) (Haggard and Kaufman 1995: 202–207; Nelson 1995: 46; Pop-Eleches 2009: 
176–189, 266–269).12 In contrast, Peru (after 1990) represents one of the very few more recent 
cases in the region in which a semi-authoritarian government implemented neoliberal reforms 
(Geddes 1995: 62; Haggard and Kaufman 1995: 207–209; Pop-Eleches 2009: 273–277).13 Notably, 
in all three cases, far-reaching reforms were implemented in response to open economic crises 
which involved hyperinflation.14 As Pop-Eleches (2009: 235) argues with a view to the trajectories 
of Argentina, Bolivia and Peru,  
                                                 
10 Haggard and Kaufman (1989: 235–239) distinguish between “strong” and “weak” authoritarian regimes, with “strong” 
regimes being characterized by stability in leadership and rules, high capacities of repression, an insulation of political 
decision-making from societal pressures, combined with a state-corporatist, controlled inclusion of key social groups; 
“weak” authoritarian regimes are, by contrast, characterized by the lack of these features, with formal government 
structures being permeated by “networks of patron-client, personalistic, and familial relations […] sustained by cor-
ruption, rent-granting, nepotism, and the discretionary allocation of governmental resources” (Haggard and Kaufman 
1989: 236). 
11 “Allowing that variations occur within the same regime type”, Haggard (1990: 45) argues “that democracies and poli-
ties organized on the basis of clientelistic networks are less insulated than corporatist regimes and those authoritarian 
regimes which limit autonomous political organization and public contestation. As a result, economic policy in liberal-
democratic and clientelistic systems is more likely to be explained by coalitional and rent-seeking pressures and less 
likely to be consistent and internally coherent.” 
12 The general ability of democratic governments to implement (neoliberal) structural adjustment programs is even more 
obvious in the case of the post-communist transitions in Middle and Eastern Europe (Pop-Eleches 2009; see also Nel-
son 1995). More specifically, the comparative study by Pop-Eleches (2009: 23) “confirms that democracy was hard to 
reconcile with IMF-style reforms during the Latin American debt crisis but was no longer an obstacle in Latin America 
in the 1990s and even improved the program implementation prospects in East European countries.” 
13 Weyland, in contrast, regards Peru as largely democratic even during the Fujimori era, “with the exception of a nine-
month hiatus in Peru in 1992 and a renewed involution at the end of the decade” (Weyland 2002: 13). 
14 As Joan Nelson (1995: 48) emphasizes with a view to Bolivia and Argentina: Whereas opposition to “painful stabiliza-
tion measures” had forced elected presidents to prematurely leave office, “[e]lectorates terrified by hyperinflation ac-
quiesced in far more draconian reforms under second-round presidents”. Analyzing Argentina and Peru, as compared 
to Brazil and Venezuela, Kurt Weyland (2002) argues that severe economic (hyperinflation) crises triggered bold ne-
oliberal reforms by bringing into power new leaders who were willing to take risks in order to prevent further deterio-
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“[…] successful long-term economic stabilization in a democratic context could only be 
achieved when a newly elected government coming to power following a period of traumat-
ic economic crisis was able to take advantage of its political honeymoon legitimacy to break 
the traditional war-of-attrition between business and labor, which has fueled Latin Ameri-
can political and economic instability of several decades.” (See also Haggard and Kaufman 
1995: 198–211; Weyland 2002) 
Generally speaking, this dynamic has had the consequence that the adoption of painful economic 
reforms by democratically elected governments was accompanied by fairly undemocratic practices, 
or a substantive hollowing-out of democratic procedures (Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 209–224; 
Oxhorn and Ducatenzeiler 1998; Weyland 2004: 143–150; Wolff 2008: 80–121, 2009). Two specific 
features stand out in this regard. First, quite a few of those governments (or presidents) that turned 
to neoliberal reforms did so after being elected on popular, if not outright anti-neoliberal, plat-
forms – a phenomenon that Susan Stokes (2001) has dubbed “Neoliberalism by Surprise”. The “era 
of economic liberalization and democracy” in Latin America was, therefore, “not always the era of 
economic liberalization via democracy” (Stokes 2001: 2). Second, and related to this, the very prac-
tice of adopting and implementing neoliberal reforms was similarly hardly democratic:  
“With the exceptions of Chile and Mexico, Latin America’s economic reforms were 
launched in the political context of competitive, multiparty democracies. Nonetheless, pres-
idents and technocratic economic cabinets were able to design and implement changes in 
macroeconomic rules with relatively little interference from the rest of the political system 
or the public sector.” (Naím 1995: 31; see also Haggard and Kaufman 1995: 183–227; Wey-
land 2004: 147–150)15 
The overall finding is that regime type clearly matters but that there is huge variation between 
broadly similar regimes (whether democratic or authoritarian) and that otherwise different re-
gimes (democratic versus authoritarian) may well have important commonalities (for instance, in 
terms of configurations and mechanisms of societal support/incorporation). We, therefore, have to 
study the characteristics and logics of political institutions (formal and informal) as well as correla-
tions and interaction of sociopolitical forces in a much more detailed way (see Section 5). 
3. ECONOMIC REFORMS IN CONTEXTS OF DEMOCRATIZATION AND UNSETTLED POLITICAL REGIMES 
A second issue refers to the specific problems that come with the simultaneous reform of both the 
political system and the economic development model, that is, the challenges associated with “the 
twin processes of economic and political liberalization” (Haggard and Kaufman 1992d: 332; see 
also Nelson 1995). The basic fact that economic reforms are adopted and implemented in the con-
text of “an unsettled regime type” (Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 6) is arguably of immediate rele-
vance – and, according to Conaghan and Malloy (1994: 13), constitutes a key contrast between the 
Western European cases studied by Katzenstein and others and the Latin American experiences:  
“In contrast [to Western Europe, JW], the uncertainty that permeated policy making in Lat-
in America in the 1980s was multidimensional. Democratization and regime transition took 
place in the absence of any real class compromise, Keynesian or otherwise. The absence of a 
                                                                                                                                     
ration. Discussing neoliberal reforms in Bolivia (after 1985), Argentina (after 1989), Brazil and Peru (after 1990), Hag-
gard and Kaufman (1995: 199) similarly summarize: “The economic and social consequences of earlier policy failures, 
and particularly the emergence of devastating hyperinflations, allowed incoming presidents to concentrate executive 
authority while at the same time substantially weakening the political hand of those social forces that had previously 
opposed reform.” 
15 Nelson (1995: 57) distinguishes between “the rather autocratic, executive-dominated style of early economic reforms” 
and a pattern of “much fuller consultation and coordination between state and society” that characterizes (and, the ar-
gument goes, is effectively needed) for second-stage reforms. In the first stages of economic reforms, these rather au-
thoritarian practices also included the use of repression of societal resistance, such as in the case of the implementation 
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social pact on the distribution of material rewards was coupled with disagreements as to the 
parameters and operation of the new democratic regimes. Economic policy making was 
marked not simply by conflicts over the content of policies; it involved a deeper struggle 
over both the procedures, mechanisms, and style of governmental decision making and also 
the whole tenor of state-society relations. The tasks of economic management became in-
terwoven with the problems of regime transition and of consolidation. The nature of poli-
tics and the character of the state itself were part of the stakes of the conflicts over economic 
policy in Latin America in the 1980s.” (Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 13) 
Haggard and Kaufman (1992d: 332–341), who explicitly tackle this issue of economic reforms in 
contexts of democratization, similarly argue that the tradeoffs faced by all governments when un-
dertaking market-oriented reforms become particularly “complex and severe” “in polities under-
going a transition to democratic governance […] since the rules of the political game are not set” 
(Haggard and Kaufman 1992d: 332). How these tradeoffs play out, however, is contingent on the 
sequencing of economic and political reforms (Haggard and Kaufman 1992d: 332). When eco-
nomic reforms are implemented under authoritarian rule to an extent that they “actually change 
the underlying social structure”, many of the tradeoffs are effectively minimized, as the example of 
Chile shows (Haggard and Kaufman 1992d: 332–336; see also Haggard 1995: 11). The predomi-
nant pattern in Latin America during the 1980s, however, was one in which the establishment of 
democratic institutions preceded the adoption of significant structural adjustment measures. This 
was a particularly difficult situation: 
“Since the shift from authoritarianism to democracy raises hopes for an improvement in 
welfare as well as political freedom, newly elected leaders face expectations that are not 
conducive to the imposition of austerity. On the contrary, whereas new administrations in-
stable electoral systems may choose to pay the short-term costs of stabilization early in their 
terms, the leaders of unconsolidated democracies may turn to economic populism as a 
means of cementing both electoral support and, where there is a lingering threat from anti-
democratic forces, broader societal support for the democratic project itself.” (Haggard and 
Kaufman 1989: 243) 
In fact, as Haggard (1995: 77) argued elsewhere, explicitly mentioning Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
and Peru, elected governments “produced profound policy failures in the 1980s as a result of delays 
in adjusting or as a result of failed ‘heterodox’ adjustment efforts” (see also Haggard and Kaufman 
1995: 183–189). As mentioned above (2.), it was precisely these failures that enabled “subsequent 
democratic governments” to exploit the crises produced by the predecessor governments and im-
plement adjustment reforms (Haggard 1995: 77; see also Haggard and Kaufman 1992d: 340, 1995: 
198–211; Nelson 1995: 46; Pop-Eleches 2009; Weyland 2002: 6–7).16 
According to Haggard and Kaufman (1992d), the general problem of economic reform after de-
mocratization is, precisely, the uncertainty that comes with political change: 
“In these new regimes, the key political and economic challenge is the routinization of poli-
tics and the reduction of the high level of uncertainty associated with the transition. In the 
first instance, this demands the stabilization of expectations regarding the basic rules of the 
political game […]. Once this context is established, the consolidation of democratic rule 
will also demand a downward adjustment of expectations concerning the ability of the state 
                                                 
16 In addition, economic crises, austerity measures, and structural adjustment policies, once implemented, also contribut-
ed to facilitating further efforts at neoliberal reforms by weakening the capacity to mobilize and sustain resistance on 
the part of the popular sectors. The scholarship that addresses this relationship is summarized in Wolff (2020a: 115–
117, with a view to organized labor) and Wolff (2020b: 177–182, with a view to marginalized groups). 
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to respond to distributive claims carried into the political arena, whether by the left or the 
right.” (Haggard and Kaufman 1992d: 340)17 
Focusing on inflation and monetary stabilization, Haggard and Kaufman (1992c: 271) find that 
“the overall degree of institutional stability” is a key factor influencing the ability of governments 
to effectively reduce inflation. In addition, unsettled regimes in general and emerging democracies 
in particular also lack other features that facilitate the implementation of monetary stabilization 
measures – such as the existence of “broad catchall parties [which] mute the conflicts among con-
tending social forces, facilitate relatively stable ruling majorities, and thus discourage abrupt 
swings in policy from one administration to the next” (Haggard and Kaufman 1992c: 271–272).18 
4. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL fORCES AND FACTORS IN ECONOMIC REFORMS 
The starting point of the economic reforms adopted across Latin America and beyond since the 
early 1980s was a situation of severe economic crisis (Pastor 1989). Measures of stabilization, by 
definition, respond to some kind of macroeconomic instability. Structural adjustment policies 
react to the crisis of an established development model. In principle, this crisis may be rather la-
tent. However, because structural adjustment is politically costly (Geddes 1995: 60; Nelson 1990b: 
4),19 governments will normally refrain from adopting and implementing such policies in the ab-
sence of a manifest crisis. In countries in the Global South, which tend to be externally indebted 
and dependent on the inflow of foreign exchange, with structurally weak currencies and asymmet-
ric trade and investment relations, economic crises almost always have an important international 
dimension (as debt and/or currency crises). They are, therefore, heavily influenced – and frequent-
ly triggered – by the dynamics of transnational (financial and/or commodities) markets as well as 
by the behavior of external creditors and donors (governments, International Financial Institu-
tions [IFIs] and private actors). This external influence on domestic reform processes is an im-
portant topic of the studies under review here.  
A first finding precisely concerns the importance of the economic crisis as trigger and driver of 
structural economic reforms. In many ways, it was the “international debt crisis” that “forced eco-
nomic adjustments on the developing world” during the 1980s (Haggard 1985: 505; see also Pastor 
1989; Stallings 1992). More specifically, across Latin America, this international debt crisis was 
accompanied by and/or triggered severe domestic economic crises, which led governments to turn 
to politically costly neoliberal reforms (Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Remmer 1998; Weyland 
2002). To be sure, however, the causal mechanism at work here is indirect only: An economic crisis 
forces the government to adopt some kind of response, while the characteristics and dynamics of 
the crisis at hand create positive and negative incentives that more or less forcefully influence gov-
ernmental decision-making on the type of response. Research, in this sense, suggests that an eco-
nomic crisis is a necessary condition for the adoption of stabilization and adjustment policies but it 
is neither sufficient nor does it determine the type of policies actually adopted and implemented 
(see Haggard and Kaufman 1992a; Nelson 1990a; Pop-Eleches 2009).20 
                                                 
17 Haggard also identifies a third group of Latin American countries made up of Colombia and Venezuela, which “had 
consolidated democracies at the time crises hit” (Haggard 1995: 77). Haggard and Kaufman (1992d) distinguish be-
tween three sequences: “Economic Reform First” (e.g., Chile under Pinochet), “Simultaneous Economic and Political 
Liberalization” (e.g., Mexico in the 1980s), and “Democracy First” (e.g., Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Peru in the 
1980s). 
18 Systematically speaking, the authors identify “party fragmentation” as a crucial factor that limits governments’ abilities 
to control inflation (Haggard and Kaufman 1992c: 271). 
19 “Adjustment, in short, is complex and controversial at a technical level and immensely conflictual at ideological and 
political levels.” (Nelson 1990b: 4) 
20 As Haggard (1990: 3) has argued, for instance, “international shocks and pressures, and the domestic crises associated 
with them, have been the most powerful stimuli”, but clearly insufficient to explain policy choice at the domestic level 
(see also Nelson 1990c: 325–326; Stallings 1992). Almost two decades later, Pop-Eleches (2009: 21) similarly concluded 
that “economic crises are not sufficient to trigger reforms in the absence of governments willing and able to use these 
crises as catalysts for decisive economic policy changes.” 
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In a statistical analysis of neoliberal reforms in South America between 1980 and 1994, Karen 
Remmer finds that difficult economic circumstances, and high inflation rates in particular, “play 
an important role in the decision to embark on a program of orthodox reform” (1998: 17). Yet, just 
as the dynamics of economic crises themselves are shaped by psychological mechanisms, percep-
tions, and interpretations, their political effects are also far from deterministic.21 In this sense, for 
instance, the comparative analysis presented in Nelson (1990a) shows that “the severity of the 
crisis” is a key factor explaining the adoption of economic reforms (Nelson 1990b: 19). Yet, “the 
scope and content of adjustment decisions” depends on interpretations, which are shaped not 
simply by available facts but also “by assessments of previous adjustment experiences and value 
judgments” (Nelson 1990b: 21). In general, “the widespread perception of the need for far-reaching 
reforms” is identified as a decisive factor explaining the adoption and implementation of far-
reaching stabilization and structural reform packages (Nelson 1990b: 32), but the specific type of 
reforms adopted in response to the crisis is “strongly influenced by the intellectual lenses through 
which economic advisors and political leaders perceive the crisis and the available options” (Nel-
son 1990b: 29; see also Kahler 1990). 
Pop-Eleches confirms (and specifies) these arguments about the relationship between crisis and 
reform. He finds that, first, “the depth of the initial economic crisis” is crucial as it helps “reduce 
resistance to reforms” (2009: 296). Second, his comparative study highlights “the importance of 
external financial need as a driver of IMF program initiation and implementation” (292). This is, 
third, reinforced by the fact that different types of economic crises lend themselves to different 
types of interpretation and domestic controversies. In Latin America during the 1980s, “the roots 
of the debt crisis were widely perceived as being of an external nature, which resulted in a lower 
willingness to bear the economic costs of adjustment policies and made it much more difficult for 
governments to implement reforms in a democratic context”; in Eastern Europe, in contrast, “the 
domestic roots of the economic crises were much less disputed, and, therefore, voters were more 
likely to support or at least tolerate neoliberal reforms despite their considerable short-term costs” 
(23).22 In general, Pop-Eleches (2009: 296) finds that “the catalytic effects of economic crisis are 
mediated by the ideological inclinations and partisan ties of key political players” (see Section 5). 
The ways in which an economic crisis is processed politically are, however, not only determined by 
domestic politics but also shaped by external actors who directly and/or indirectly influence do-
mestic debates and decision-making processes. This, in particular, concerns the much-debated role 
of the IMF (or the IFIs more broadly speaking), but also of major creditor/donor countries (such 
as the US). 
With a view to the role of the IFIs in Latin America during the 1980s, much debate focused on the 
IMF. In fact, while the IMF had played a limited role in the region during the 1970s, this changed 
dramatically with the debt crisis, which largely closed access to private foreign credit. As Manuel 
Pastor summarizes: 
“By 1983, three-quarters of the Latin American countries were operating under either a 
Stand-by Arrangement or the Extended Fund Facility; moreover, all of the programs in this 
period were so-called ‘upper credit tranche’ arrangement involving a high degree of condi-
tionality. As the decade proceeded, most of the remaining one-quarter of Latin America al-
                                                 
21 In his study on The Politics of Market Reforms in Fragile Democracies, Kurt Weyland (2002) explicitly draws on psycho-
logical findings, and prospect theory in particularly, in order to help explain how severe economic crises cause gov-
ernments (or, rather, political leaders) to adopt bold and risky neoliberal reforms. In a nutshell, he argues that “the in-
tersection of two conditions – the assumption of power by a new leader and the eruption of severe problems that put 
this leader in the domain of losses – is crucial for the initiation of drastic adjustment. Since severe problems often trig-
ger elite renovation, the crisis factor appears as the main cause for the adoption of drastic market reform. Cognitive-
psychological results thus provide a microfoundation for crisis arguments […]” (Weyland 2002: 5). 
22 Also, according to Pop-Eleches (2009: 171), “the perceived fit between the type of the crisis and the policy course 
advocated by the IMF” matters: “[…] whereas inflation, where the Fund’s track record is generally good, triggered IMF 
programs in both regions, recessions only mattered in Eastern Europe but not in Latin America, where the Fund’s em-
phasis on austerity measures was seen by many as hurting rather than helping economic growth.” 
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so fell under IMF control and the few countries that escaped direct IMF intervention were 
often under indirect IMF supervision.” (Pastor 1989: 90) 
“In the years of the debt crisis, the Fund’s power and command over Latin America has ris-
en dramatically. With a virtual monopoly over access to private capital flows and with al-
most all of Latin America operating under its programs, the IMF has presided over an era 
marked by continuing debt tribute coupled with stagnant growth and regressive redistribu-
tion. It is a performance that has hurt the vast majority of Latin Americans while delivering 
benefits to a thin strand of elites in North and South.” (Pastor 1989: 100) 
While the IMF’s prominent role in Latin America throughout the decade (and beyond) is hard to 
dispute, comparative research in the 1980s significantly qualified the popular notion of an exten-
sive “power and command” of the IMF over Latin American economic policy-making. By contrast, 
several scholars found that the power of the IMF to enforce economic reforms on poor and vulner-
able countries (in Latin America and beyond) was actually much more limited and contingent on 
other factors than many had expected (see Haggard 1985; Kahler 1985, 1992; Nelson 1990a; Rem-
mer 1986; Stiles 1987, 1990). In a study from 1986, for instance, Karen Remmer found that failure 
to implement IMF programs “has been the norm in Latin America, not the exception” and con-
cludes: 
“The power of the IMF remains a useful myth for governments seeking a scapegoat to ex-
plain difficult economic conditions associated with severe balance of payments disequilib-
ria, but the ability of the IMF to impose programs from the outside is distinctively limited.” 
(Remmer 1986: 21) 
Stephan Haggard, in a 1985 study of 30 adjustment programs under the IMF’s Extended Fund 
Facility (EFF), came to similar results23 and argued that it was not so much the financial resources 
of the IMF (and the World Bank) per se that mattered. Rather, “the networks of transnational 
relations established through IMF and World Bank programs” constitute “the political bases for 
the power and influence of these organizations”. These networks, however, are not simply external 
but crucially depend on “IMF-sympathetic ‘stabilizing cadre’ within the state” (Haggard 1985: 534; 
see also Nelson 1990c: 330–331). According to this reading, the IMF does not so much (or, at least, 
not only) operate as an external actor that coerces unwilling recipient governments into complying 
with its conditions, but it shapes economic policy-making in recipient countries through its direct 
relations with like-minded technocratic elites within the countries and governments at hand (see 
5.).24 In a similar vein, Kendall Stiles (1990: 972) has noted “the significance of IMF ‘ideology’ in 
shaping the adjustment policies of nations, even if the IMF staff are not directly involved in the 
national policy process”, with Argentina being a case in point (see also Stiles 1987).25 
                                                 
23 Haggard (1985: 505–506) found that 24 of these 30 IMF programs “were renegotiated, or had payments interrupted, or 
were quietly allowed to lapse”, with 16 being “formally canceled by the IMF”. 
24 Kahler (1992: 126) similarly emphasizes the role of a technocratic “transnational community”, which in particular 
consists of people “trained as economists at American or European universities”, and concludes: “Close alignment be-
tween a cadre of national economic technocrats and the IFIs seems to have been a prerequisite for agreement in this 
sample of cases, whether middle-income countries with highly developed bureaucratic structures or low-income state 
with weak authoritarian regimes.” (127). Yet, he adds, although “the presence of technocratic allies may be a necessary 
condition for successful influence in most developing countries” (130), “technocratic alignment” failed “when learning 
did not extend up (to the political principals), laterally (to the implementing agencies), and down (to a trained civil ser-
vice)” (128). On a similar note, Haggard and Webb emphasize the role of “foreign advisers, but also the training of 
technocrats at foreign universities, government-sponsored exchange programs, and work experience in multinational 
corporations” (Haggard and Webb 1994b: 28) and conclude: “Over the long run, material assistance [by external ac-
tors] may be less important than training and socialization, which can change the political actors and alter the domestic 
debate surrounding the adjustment process.” (Haggard and Webb 1994b: 25–26; see also Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 
216) 
25 In her statistical analysis of neoliberal reforms in South America between 1980 and 1994, Remmer finds that “interna-
tional aid” has a (weakly) positive effect on the initiation and durability of reforms, while IMF conditionality actually 
reduces the durability of reform programs (1998: 19, 22). Her interpretation of the latter finding is that “domestic, as 
opposed to IMF, program design”, which meets “local needs”, is a key condition for durable reform programs (22). 
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One external factor that qualifies IMF influence is related to geopolitical dynamics and the role of 
major powers (above all, the US). Studies have shown, for instance, that the strategic importance of 
recipient countries to those major Western states that have traditionally dominated decision-
making at the IMF shapes negotiations with the IMF and their outcomes (see the brief summary in 
Caraway et al. 2012: 32).26 Pop-Eleches also finds “that the IMF’s response to economic crises is 
driven by the changing imperatives of international financial stability and the changing interests of 
large IMF member countries” (2009: 3), which implies that countries are treated differently accord-
ing to their economic size and their specific relevance in a given international setting. The same 
variation also applies to the availability of alternative international sources of funding, such as 
“economic or military aid, remittances, export earnings, or commercial borrowing” (Haggard 
1985: 531), which reduces the leverage of the IMF:  
“One would thus expect the Fund to have most leverage when conditions are desperate and 
other options are foreclosed.” (Haggard 1985: 533; see also Haggard and Kaufman 1989: 
216–217; Kahler 1992: 111; Pastor 1989: 86)27 
Looking back at stabilization and adjustment programs during the 1980s, Miles Kahler finds that 
“significant influence by external agencies on decisions to undertake stabilization programs […] 
was limited to a small number of governments in the sample, those delicately balanced or deeply 
divided cases in which external agencies did seem to tilt decisions on economic program in favor 
of stabilization” (Kahler 1992: 98).28 In a similar vein, the comparative analysis coordinated by Joan 
Nelson finds:  
“External pressures had greatest influence on the timing and scope of adjustment decisions 
not with the most fragile governments nor with those that had strong ideas on their own, 
but with an intermediate category: governments that were divided or indecisive but had suf-
ficient authority to take action.” (Nelson 1990c: 330)  
However, external attempts to enforce stabilization measures even “failed to induce decisions from 
the weakest and most divided governments”, confirming that “external agencies were less im-
portant than domestic political forces in determining the timing and scope of adjustment deci-
sions” (Nelson 1990c: 330; emphasis in the original). This is not to say that external actors in gen-
eral and the IFIs in particular did not matter. Yet, their actual impact was contingent on the struc-
tures and dynamics of domestic politics, as Joan Nelson concludes: 
“Concerted pressure from the international financial institutions, bilateral donors, and 
commercial banks and the providing or withholding of financial relief play prominent roles 
in the tales of all our cases. But the degree to which such pressures actually induced deci-
sions that would not otherwise have been taken varied greatly.” (Nelson 1990c: 330) 
“External advice and pressure often stretched internal political constraints on structural 
change, contributing in important ways to implementation. But domestic politics set the 
                                                 
26 Based on an analysis of IMF programs in 38 countries between 1997 and 2003, Dreher and Jensen (2007), for instance, 
show that countries that are politically aligned with the US (and other G7 countries), as measured by their voting be-
havior in the UN General Assembly, tend to receive IMF loans with a smaller number of conditions attached. See also 
Haggard and Kaufman (1989: 213–216).  
27 The other way round, a crucial factor that has reinforced the power of the IMF has been the fact that the signing of, and 
compliance with, an IMF agreement has frequently been used and/or perceived as a precondition for further financial 
support (aid, credits, debt rescheduling) from third parties (Pop-Eleches 2009: 75–76). 
28 Kahler (1992: 98) also notes that the impact of the IMF and the World Bank “was highest in the case of smaller coun-
tries and those with limited state capabilities, where the technocratic team was stretched to the limit”, referring to cases 
of Ghana, Jamaica, and Zambia. In a similar vein, Nelson (1990c: 342) concludes that “where analytic capabilities were 
limited, these [IMF] consultations could make a significant (if not always welcome) contribution to the fine-tuning of 
policies as economic trends unfolded.”  
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basic parameters of government efforts to carry out adjustment programs.” (Nelson 1990c: 
344)29 
Barbara Stallings (1992) brings the different external dimensions together by distinguishing be-
tween three types of mechanisms of international influence:  
(1) International markets, which “constitute the constraints – and opportunities – within which 
Third World actors must operate” (48);30 
(2) “the economic, political, and ideological ‘linkage’ between domestic groups and international 
actors, which makes elite (and middle class) groups in Third World countries “identify with the 
interests and outlook of international actors” (48, 52); and  
(3) “leverage”, that is, “the direct use of power by international actors, with a promise of reward (or 
a threat of punishment) for carrying out (or not) a desired policy” (55).  
In sum, she argues “that international factors are crucial in explaining broad shifts in policy” and 
are “also useful in accounting for variation across countries”, but – again – acknowledges that for 
the latter purpose “domestic factors are essential too” (Stallings 1992: 43). 
Furthermore, it is important to take into consideration that the international context – and the 
relevant international actors, forces, and context conditions – also change over time. In terms of 
ideology, the turn from macroeconomic stabilization to structural adjustment reforms reflected 
changes in the dominant thinking within international financial and development circles (Kahler 
1990).31 Broadly in line with this overall evolution of internationally hegemonic development 
thinking, IMF policy advice and conditionality has similarly seen important changes (but also 
important continuities). During the 1980s and 1990s, the scope of IMF programs expanded from a 
narrow focus on austerity and debt repayment to an increasing emphasis on structural adjustment 
during the 1980s and 1990s (see Broome 2015: 148; IMF 2001: 22–27; Pop-Eleches 2009: 3). In 
more recent years, Broome (2015: 161) has identified a return (“back to basics”) to “a narrower 
focus on the promotion of fiscal consolidation”, with less emphasis on the promotion of “one-size-
fits-all structural reforms”.32 The specific sub type of labor-related loan conditions confirms this 
general trend: Prior to 1987, no labor conditions were included in IMF programs, but afterwards 
their number increased significantly until peaking in 1999, “when nearly 44 percent of all IMF 
programs included at least one labor condition” (Caraway et al. 2012: 30).33 Other studies, such as 
                                                 
29 Haggard and Webb (1994b: 5–6) also conclude that external actors play a supportive, rather than a decisive role: “There 
is no evidence from the countries studied that external actors tipped the political scales in favor of reform when the 
domestic institutional and coalitional environment was unfavorable; there is evidence that lending in such settings 
postponed adjustment. Providing support to committed governments did, however, increase the domestic credibility of 
the reformers, both by improving overall performance and by increasing their freedom of maneuver.” See also Pop-
Eleches (2009: chapters 3–4). 
30 In terms of such international constraints and opportunities, the study by Pop-Eleches emphasizes the crucial differ-
ences in the international economic context that characterize the international debt crisis of the 1980s and the “finan-
cial boom of the 1990s” (2009: 285). 
31 In a broader sense, Pop-Eleches (2009: 3–4) has argued that “international ideological contestation” has looked differ-
ently during the 1980s, “the final decade of the Cold War”, than during the 1990s, which had been marked by a global 
economic expansion and the hegemony of neoliberal thinking. The 2000s and 2010s present yet another context. 
32 More precisely, in his comparison of IMF’s policy advice to national authorities during the negotiation of stand-by 
arrangement loans between 1985 and 2012, Broome identifies a “high degree of consistency in the IMF’s policy advice 
across three policy areas: (1) pro-cyclical fiscal discipline, (2) the reallocation of public spending from sector subsidies 
toward targeted spending on health, education, and infrastructural investment, and (3) addressing revenue shortfalls 
through broadening the tax system, in particular the expansion of indirect taxation on consumption.” (Broome 2015: 
158). With a view to “civil service retrenchment”, he also finds “a consistently high level of frequency across three out 
of the four sample sets”, the exception being the years 2008–2010 (Broome 2015: 157). In contrast, since 2008, the IMF 
has “placed far less emphasis” on “(1) interest rate liberalization,(2) the liberalization of trade restrictions, and (3) the 
privatization of public enterprises, assets, and services” (Broome 2015: 159). This broadly corresponds to the stated aim 
of the IMF to narrow the scope of structural conditionality (IMF 2001: 30–36). A related trend, which has partially 
changed the ways in which the IMF (and the World Bank) and recipient governments negotiate economic reforms, 
concerns the debate on ownership as a necessary feature of successful reform programs (see Boughton 2003). 
33 Data in this study only cover the years until 2000. It, therefore, remains to be seen whether the gradual reduction in 
labor-related conditions from 1999 to 2000 has continued since the turn of the century. 
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Hernandez (2020) for the case of Argentina (1989–2017), however, find much more continuity in 
the neoliberal stabilization and structural adjustment agenda as promoted by the IMF. 
In sum, the insight from the studies reviewed here is that international constraints, pressures and 
influences play an important role in the adoption and implementation of stabilization and adjust-
ment policies, but that they shape these policies only indirectly, mediated through domestic struc-
tures, institutions and processes (see Haggard 1990; Haggard and Kaufman 1989, 1992a; Nelson 
1990a). 
5. DOMESTIC STRUCTURES AND ACTORS IN ECONOMIC REFORMS 
There is no doubt that domestic politics matter significantly when it comes to implementing IMF-
supported stabilization and adjustment programs. Already in 1985, Haggard noted that “efforts at 
stabilization and structural adjustment are routinely stymied by domestic political forces” (Hag-
gard 1985: 505). With a view to IMF-supported structural adjustment programs between 1986 and 
1997, an internal study by the IMF (2001) found that only 25 percent werecompleted without 
significant interruptions:  
“Domestic political constraints such as politicalupheavals, flagging commitment from the 
authorities (often a consequence of difficultyin mustering political support for new 
policies), and opposition from domesticinterest groups played a role in most of the 
program interruptions.” (Caraway et al. 2012: 36; refering to IMF 2001: 54–56). 
Systematically speaking, the literature deals with five different dimensions of domestic politics: 
 The role of political/state institutions; 
 the role of state actors and political elites; 
 the role of societal actors and (interest) groups, elite, and non-elite; 
 the role of configurations of social forces or social structures; 
 the role of ideas, ideologies, and perceptions. 
Regarding (1) political institutions, a key feature emphasized by a series of studies concerns the 
relative autonomy of political institutions or the degree of insulation of political decision-making 
from societal interests (see Haggard 1990: 42–46; Haggard and Kaufman 1992a; Kaufman 1985: 
477; Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 213–214). While scholars agree that insulation generally facili-
tates the adoption of adjustment reforms, Haggard and Kaufman (1992b) specify that “reform 
initiatives are more likely where and when political institutions insulate politicians and their tech-
nocratic allies from particular interest group constraints”, but that the “consolidation of reform, by 
contrast, involves stabilizing expectations around a new set of incentives and convincing economic 
agents that they cannot be reversed at the discretion of individual decision makers”, which “is most 
likely where governments have constructed relatively stable coalitions of political support that 
encompass major private sector beneficiaries, and have secured at least the acquiescence of the 
major political forces competing within the political system” (Haggard and Kaufman 1992b: 19–
20).34 The notion of “embedded autonomy” brings both arguments together: In order to success-
fully implement economic reforms, states need autonomy in the sense of “a coherent, self-
orienting, Weberian sort of administrative structure”. But this relatively autonomous bureaucracy 
simultaneously has to be embedded in a “concrete network of external ties” that “allows the state to 
assess, monitor, and shape private responses to policy initiatives” (Evans 1992: 178–179; see also 
Naím 1995). Also, “sustaining and consolidating reform requires building of support” (Haggard 
and Webb 1994b: 15).35 
                                                 
34 See also Haggard and Webb (1994b: 15); Maravall (1995: 19); Nelson (1995: 57); Pop-Eleches (2009: 17). 
35 In comparing the initiation and implementation of far-reaching neoliberal reforms in Bolivia (after 1985), Argentina 
(after 1989), Brazil and Peru (after 1990), for instance, the governments’ “ability to build viable bases of party and in-
terest-group support” has been identified as “a crucial variable distinguishing the initiation and consolidation phases of 
reform” (Haggard and Kaufman 1995: 202). The other way round: “In the absence of such bases of support, insulated 
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A related institutional feature concerns the “concentration of authority” in the executive, identified 
by Joan M. Nelson (1990b: 31–32) as one of two key characteristics that the countries “where broad 
reforms were adopted and substantially implemented” share:36 
“Concentrated authority directly facilities implementation; it also heightens the credibility 
of programs, crucially shaping both political and economic responses.” (Nelson 1990b: 25; 
see also Haggard and Kaufman 1995: 163–165)37 
The other way round, political regimes in which the relative autonomy of the state, the concentra-
tion of power in the executive and/or the insulation of political decision-making from societal 
interests is low, economic reforms are difficult to achieve. The comparative study edited by Joan 
Nelson (1990a) finds that in most cases in which “political institutions and coalitions limited the 
autonomy of chief executives, adjustment decisions were confined to stabilization plus, perhaps, 
piecemeal, medium-term reforms.” (Nelson 1990c: 330). With a view to authoritarian regimes, 
Haggard argues that the adoption and implementation of structural adjustment is less likely when 
political authority and legitimation depends on “state patronage” or “clientelism” (Haggard 1985: 
511). In more general terms, he finds that “bureaucracies” and “administrative ‘subsystems’”, 
which may be “politically captured or constrained by specific clients”, present important limita-
tions to the implementation of adjustment policies (Haggard 1985: 532). Generally speaking, when 
states lack “the requisite bureaucratic structures” that enable their relative autonomy, their “em-
beddedness” becomes a problem for the implementation of economic reforms (Evans 1992: 179). 
Evans’s notion of embedded autonomy also includes the importance of administrative or bureau-
cratic capacities (see above). In this vein, Nelson also argues that the “[c]apacity to generate in-
formed and objective analyses of economic problems and options” is important, as “are the in-
struments and institutions that permit implementation” (Nelson 1990b: 21). Empirically, she con-
cludes that “[a]nalytic capabilities affect the scope as well as the timing of adjustment decisions” 
(Nelson 1990c: 327).  
According to Haggard and Kaufman, the capacity of governments to effectively implement eco-
nomic reforms also depends on the nature of the party system in place. More specifically, in a 
comparative analysis of Latin American and Asian cases, they find that the existence of a frag-
mented party system severely hinders the implementation of monetary stabilization measures that 
effectively reduce inflation (Haggard and Kaufman 1992c: 299).38 In a similar vein, Haggard and 
Webb (1994b: 8–11) argue that the extent to which party systems are polarized and fragmented 
crucially shapes economic reforms (in democratic regimes) (see also Haggard and Kaufman 1995: 
166–174).39 
                                                                                                                                     
technocratic agencies become politically isolated and programs become vulnerable to reversal.” (Haggard and Webb 
1994b: 15) 
36 More specifically, she talks about “an executive empowered by some combination of established political institutions 
and more transient circumstances with an unusual concentration of authority” (Nelson 1990b: 32; see also Nelson 
1990c: 335, 347). 
37 Against this conventional wisdom, Karen Remmer, in her statistical analysis of neoliberal reforms in South America 
between 1980 and 1994, does not confirm the hypothesis that executive strength supports the initiation and/or the du-
ration of reform programs (Remmer 1998). 
38 More precisely, Haggard and Kaufman (1992c: 299) find that “about one-third of the inflations in fragmented systems 
were brought down for three years, as compared to almost 70 percent of inflations in political systems where conflict 
was mediated by catchall parties or suppressed. In the nonfragmented settings, democracies did about as well as au-
thoritarian regimes, each having a failure rate of roughly 30 percent. In fragmented party systems, however, democratic 
regimes had great difficulty stabilizing. […] Two of the three authoritarian regimes with fragmented party systems also 
failed to stabilize.” 
39 Empirically, Haggard and Kaufman (1995) argue that the failure of economic policies/reforms in Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil and Peru during the 1980s was particularly due to “institutional characteristics of the party systems [which] ag-
gravated partisan conflict and underlying social divisions”: “The central challenge faced by these new democratic gov-
ernments lay in the combination of fragmentation with the polarizing effects of populist and left oppositions.” (Hag-
gard and Kaufman 1995: 197) What is more, “party competition in these polarized and/or fragmented systems also im-
peded efforts to negotiate agreements on policy among contenting interest groups”, including organized labor and 
business (Haggard and Kaufman 1995: 198).  
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Regarding (2) state actors and political elites, Haggard has argued that “the power, cohesion, and 
ideological orientation of technocrats” constitutes as “an important variable in explaining the fate 
of IMF programs” (Haggard 1985: 531). More specifically, “a cohesive group of sympathetic eco-
nomic technocratic”, which forms “the domestic half of a transnational coalition with the Fund” 
(Haggard 1985: 532), is found to be “a prerequisite for program success” (Haggard 1985: 534).40 
The comparative study edited by Nelson (1990a) finds that the existence of a united “economic 
team” is crucial for both the adoption and the implementation of economic reforms (Nelson 
1990c: 327, 339).41 
In his Pathways from the Periphery, Haggard (1990: 4) has broadly argued that “[t]he strategies that 
states pursue and the fashion in which they are implemented hinge less on broad social-structural 
forces than on the politically driven choices of state elites; the tactical give-and-take and coalition 
building characteristic of political life”.42 Haggard and Kaufman (1992b: 18) similarly emphasize 
the role of state actors, given that they “play a crucial mediating role between the international and 
the domestic arena” and have “substantial power over the policy agenda”. Nelson (1990b: 24) also 
highlights the important role of “leadership, tactics, and political configuration”. Emphasizing the 
flipside of this argument, Barbara Geddes (1995: 68) argues that “state officials” are key actors 
when it comes to adopting and implementing economic reforms, because “the biggest, and certain-
ly the most articulate and politically influential, losers from the transition to a more market-
oriented economy are government officials, ruling-party cadres, cronies of rulers, and the close 
allies of all three.”43 At the highest level of politicians in charge of government, she notes “that 
most reforms are initiated by executives who for one reason or another are not beholden to the 
party, faction, or group that has previously benefited from state intervention” (Geddes 1995: 70).44 
Regarding (3) the role of societal actors and (interest) groups, a key distinction is between those 
(elite) groups that normally directly participate in the design and adoption of economic reforms, 
and other social groups that are at times relevant, but mostly rather in terms of constraining, 
blocking or thwarting the adoption or implementation of reforms. The former include political 
elites, domestic (partially internationalized) economic elites/capitalist class, and a technocratic elite 
                                                 
40 “Staffed by large cadres of technocratic personnel and linked to international academic centers of professional training 
and research, such bureaucracies have acquired the degree of ‘relative autonomy’ required to set stabilization plans in 
motion, even in the face of high political risks and uncertain economic results.” (Kaufman 1985: 477) With a view to 
Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru, Conaghan and Malloy (1994: 214) similarly find that neoliberal policies during the 1980s 
“were dictated by a small coterie in the executive, without much in the way of consultation except for exchanges with 
international institutions, the IMF and the World Bank.” 
41 With a view to technical capacities, again, a crucial difference applies to different phases or types of economic reforms 
(stabilization versus structural adjustment): “Many longer-term structural reforms are more complex administratively, 
and require coordinated action by more agencies than do most of the elements of short-run stabilization programs. 
Therefore, not only central economic staff able to fine-tune ongoing policies, but also the scope of central government 
authority and the depth of managerial talent in the public sector become crucial to implementation.” (Nelson 1990c: 
340) 
42 “I see political coalitions not as given by social structure or international constraints but as the constructs of political 
leadership and organization.” (Haggard 1990: 4) 
43 See also Nelson (1990c: 357): “The strong ‘minimal state’ thrust of orthodox reform strategy in the 1980s directly 
confronts an array of vested individual and institutional interests in existing arrangements within the very govern-
ments urged to implement reforms.” As she emphasizes this is partly but not only an issue of corruption: “In many 
countries, most higher civil servants hold extensive interests, personally or through their families, in private enterprises 
benefiting from existing arrangements; these holdings are fully legal, but constitute a major conflict of interest. Still 
more obviously, public employees at all levels see their jobs at stake in efforts to trim the public rolls or rationalize or 
privatize parastatals. Their unions are among the most powerful in the country” (Nelson 1990c: 357). The research pre-
sented in Haggard and Webb (1994a) similarly confirms “the crucial role played by bureaucratic organizations in both 
initiating and consolidating reform efforts (Haggard and Webb 1994b: 13). The “Reform of Bureaucracies” (Haggard 
and Webb 1994b: 13–15), which includes insulating bureaucratic (or technocratic) units in charge of economic reforms 
and improving their technical capabilities, is, therefore, both a key element and a precondition of structural economic 
reforms. 
44 This observation is based on a comparative study on eleven countries (Argentina, Brazil, Greece, Mexico, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Spain, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zambia). Again, this is in line with the findings reported by Nelson 
(1990c: 357): “At the highest levels of the state machinery, political leaders often also have vested political […] interests 
in existing administrative arrangements, which further constrain state capacity to implement reforms.”  
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within the state bureaucracy. The latter include organized labor but also other interest groups 
representing the middle classes and urban or rural popular sectors. 
In their comparative historical study of the turn to neoliberal economic reforms in Bolivia, Ecua-
dor and Peru, Conaghan and Malloy identify “three (sometimes overlapping) sets of actors” that 
“struggle to acquire and maintain control over the agenda in economic policy”: “the domestic 
capitalist class, the political class, and a cadre of technocratic elites who manage the policy-making 
bureaucracies inside the executive branch of government” (1994: 16). Organized labor and other 
popular sector groups, by contrast, “were systematically marginalized from significant participa-
tion in economic policy making”: 
“Labor and other lower-class groups were relegated to a largely reactive role; they vigorous-
ly protested austerity programs but were unsuccessful in staving off neoliberal experimenta-
tion. As such, labor occupies the wings of our analyses while capitalists, technocrats, and 
politicians hold center stage.” (Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 17) 
Kaufman (1985: 478) emphasizes “the foundations of the sociopolitical cleavages mobilized within 
civil society” and, more specifically, the role and power of “big business” versus “the ‘popular sec-
tors’”: 
“Major sectors of ‘big business’ – not only the old agro-exporting elites but also large for-
eign and domestic industrial and financial groups – are usually at the center of the support 
coalitions that form around technocratic initiatives. Even when such groups quietly seek to 
evade austerity for themselves, they most often adopt positions of open support or benevo-
lent neutrality toward stabilization programs in general. Conversely, although the other side 
often includes smaller businesses, military nationalists, and intellectuals, the principal op-
position comes from the ‘popular sectors’ incorporated into the political system initially 
during the 1930s and 1940s: blue-collar unions, allied white-collar organizations, and mass-
based political parties. Even popularly oriented governments typically encounter resistance 
from such groups when they sponsor stabilization packages.” (Kaufman 1985: 478)45 
With a view to “major interest groups” that shape adjustment policies as political forces, Nelson 
(1990b: 32) similarly concludes: “Two groups emerge as powerful actors: business interests and the 
state machinery itself. Organized labor and agricultural interests play much less important roles.”46 
The assumption that economic elites, or the domestic business community, generally support 
market-oriented economic reforms is, however, overly simplistic (see Haggard and Webb 1994b: 
18–20; Sullivan 1995). Theoretically, we should expect different segments of the business commu-
nity to hold different policy preferences vis-à-vis neoliberal economic reforms. As mentioned 
above, Kaufman (1985: 478) distinguishes between “‘big business’ – not only the old agro-
exporting elites but also large foreign and domestic industrial and financial groups”, which are 
usually supportive, and “smaller businesses”, which are often part of the opposition. More specifi-
cally, scholars have differentiated between export-oriented sectors (which tend to gain from re-
forms) and sectors that depend on protectionist and import-substitution policies (which tend to 
lose) (see Haggard and Webb 1994b: 19; Nelson 1990c: 352; Sullivan 1995: 183). A further key 
distinction, introduced by Jeffrey Frieden (1988), is between liquid asset holders (which tend to 
win) and fixed-asset holders: “smaller import-substituting manufacturers, enterprises with large 
fixed investments, companies tied closely to state-owner enterprise” (which tend to lose) (Nelson 
1990c: 352).47 As Haggard and Kaufman summarize: 
                                                 
45 The consequence: “Governments depending mainly on labor and popular support are more likely to adopt heterodox 
programs; those relying on business and financial support to favor neoorthodox prescriptions.” (Nelson 1990b: 25) 
46  In general terms, Nelson (1990c: 341) finds that in cases of far-reaching structural reforms, “the groups benefiting 
from the policies and programs of the previous regimes were disempowered under the new governments”. 
47 “The structure of business interests determines their policy preferences, but the nature and channels of their political 
activities are shaped by their relationships with political authorities” (Nelson 1990c: 353). In contrast to other social 
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“Liquid asset holders, export-oriented industries, financial interests, and larger industrial 
and commercial firms with access to external credit markets are more likely to benefit from 
traditional stabilization and structural adjustment measures. Even where they are not politi-
cally organized, liquid asset holders can exert pressure on decision makers through the 
threat of capital flight. […] Firms with investments in specific assets, import-substituting 
industries, […] and companies dependent on government contracts and credit are more 
likely to be threatened by devaluation, budget cuts, restrictions on domestic credit, and re-
forms that reduce protection and government support. […] In countries where such firms 
are prominent and can mobilize political resources through peak organizations, parties, and 
the media, they will challenge the imposition of fiscal and monetary austerity. Unable to flee 
or circumvent the adverse consequences of stabilization, they stay and fight.” (Haggard and 
Kaufman 1989: 222)48 
Empirically, Karen Remmer’s statistical analysis of neoliberal reforms in South America between 
1980 and 1994 suggests that “high level of exports relative to GDP” seem to increase the probability 
of reform initiation (1998: 18), which lends some support to the expectation that “the relative eco-
nomic weight of private-sector exporting interests” should increase the probability that orthodox 
reforms are adopted (Remmer1998: 10; emphasis in the original). Comparative case studies con-
firm that business elites have played diverse roles. In Brazil, in the early 1980s, for instance, “Sao 
Paulo’s influential industrialists, who had come to rely heavily on parastatal orders and inputs” 
responded to the turn to fiscal austerity by joining the opposition to the military government 
(Frieden 1988: 7). In the case of Chile under Pinochet, by contrast, “class concerns” (“fear of the 
Left”) rather than “sectoral concerns” took precedence and business, including industrialists, re-
frained from joining the opposition to the government in the context of the economic crisis of the 
early 1980s (Frieden 1988: 9).49 With a view to the democratically elected governments in Argenti-
na, Bolivia, Brazil, and Peru during the 1980s, Haggard and Kaufman (1995: 198) observe that “the 
absence of business support” contributed to the failure of governmental adjustment efforts:  
“The private sector strongly resisted measures that might have alleviated the fiscal crisis, in-
cluding particularly tax reform, and continued to press particularistic claims on the gov-
ernment.” (Haggard and Kaufman 1995: 198) 
In Ecuador and Peru, where democratically elected governments during the 1980s attempted to 
impose stabilization and structural adjustment programs, divisions within the business community 
and resistance against specific reform measures (e.g. trade liberalization) on the part of key eco-
nomic groups contributed to the failure of these neoliberal experiments. By contrast, in Bolivia, 
where the industrial sector was much weaker (and divided), unified business support facilitated the 
implementation of far-reaching stabilization and structural adjustment policies under the 1985 
“New Economic Policy” (Conaghan and Malloy 1994).50 In Argentina under President Menem and 
Mexico under President Salinas, neoliberal governments deliberately built “a new strategic rela-
tionship with the most diversified, concentrated, and internationally competitive sectors of busi-
ness”, while weakening ties to “domestically oriented industrialists and nondiversified, single-
sector firms” (Gibson 1997: 356). 
                                                                                                                                     
sectors, however, business interests also influence policy-making through the mere (anticipated) effect on their private 
investment decisions (Nelson 1990c: 351–354). On business power in Latin America, see Fairfield (2015) and Wolff 
(2016). 
48 Regarding agricultural interest groups and rural areas in general, Joan Nelson concludes: “Rural interests are usually 
politically weak, and rural approval may not translate into effective political support for adjustment.” (Nelson 1990c: 
355; see also the – more complex – assessment by Haggard and Kaufman 1989: 228–232). 
49 Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela (in the early 1980s) are in-between cases in terms of capital-labor relations, sectoral 
patterns of cooperation and conflict and the extent of marked-based economic policies, according to Frieden (1988: 9–
15). 
50 But in the case of Bolivia after 1985, as Pop-Eleches (2009: 186) argues, the fact that the technocrats in charge of eco-
nomic policy-making “largely ignored” the demands from domestic business actors, which took issue with “the reduc-
tion of tariffs and private-sector credits”, also contributed to the successful implementation of the economic reforms.  
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The relative strength of the different economic sectors, however, is not fixed, but itself shaped by 
the very impact of economic crises and reforms on private business (Haggard and Kaufman 1989: 
224). For instance, in Argentina, the “deregulation of financial markets [implemented by the mili-
tary regime after the 1976 coup] induced large firms in the industrial sector to invest in financial 
activities” (Haggard and Kaufman 1989: 224). Also, the diversity of business positions vis-à-vis 
specific adjustment measures notwithstanding, at the general level of economic (development) 
ideologies, business elites across Latin America since the 1970s have gradually converged around 
and actively promoted a market- and outwards-oriented, neoliberal alternative to the previously 
hegemonic (statist, developmentalist) conception of economic development. As Conaghan and 
Malloy conclude with a view to Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, “business interest groups laid the 
groundwork for the development of domestic neoliberal coalitions with their antistatism cam-
paigns” (1994: 216).51 
With a view to organized labor, opposition to stabilization and adjustment reforms is certainly 
rather the norm than the exception. This, in particular, concerns the urban working class – as 
opposed to “rural workers and smallholders and underemployed informal sector workers”, who 
tend to be “difficult to mobilize politically” and may actually benefit from stabilization and struc-
tural adjustment policies (Kaufmann and Haggard 1989: 224).52 During the 1980s, workers in the 
public sector as well as in the urban private sector (where they tended to be “concentrated in pro-
tected industries”) were immediately threatened by austerity, devaluation, import liberalization, 
and privatization, while being relatively well-organized (Kaufmann and Haggard 1989: 225; see 
also Nelson 1992).53 Still, while it was “widely assumed that organized labor is the most likely inter-
est group to derail adjustment efforts, whether from within or outside the governing coalition” 
(Nelson 1990b: 25), research suggests that “even strong unions do not necessarily or automatically 
oppose adjustment measures” (Nelson 1992: 249).54 As Haggard and Kaufman have argued, we 
should expect “a non-monotonic relation between the political strength or organized labor and the 
challenges they are likely to pose to stabilization and adjustment initiatives” (1989: 225): 
“Where strategic labor sectors are weak and penetrated, the burdens of stabilization policies 
are easy to impose, although the economic program, and the government itself, may en-
counter long-term costs in terms of losses of legitimacy. […] On the other hand, labor may 
acquiesce to restraint within the context of a stabilization program in situations where it is 
represented by powerful peak associations with secure positions in the political process. 
[…] The most immediate political challenges to stabilization are likely to emerge in inter-
mediate situations, where unions or informal sector workers possess sufficient resources for 
                                                 
51 “Young technocrats were enlisted into the campaign by business interest groups; they translated the antistatist mood 
into more systematic technical critiques of public policies. Many of the same business leaders and technocrats, in turn, 
gave voice to their concerns inside political parties, either as leaders or as independent advisors of the parties.” (Cona-
ghan and Malloy 1994: 216) 
52 This is, of course, related to the fact that it is the “urban, formal-sector working class” that “suffered significant losses 
during adjustment episodes in all countries for which data are available” (Geddes 1995: 65). Joan Nelson (1992: 232) al-
so notes that “the urban working classes and middle strata […] remain better off than the poor (though the gap has 
narrowed), and are less at immediate risk of hunger and disease. But compared to their precrisis standards of living, 
they have suffered still larger relative drops. […] And in contrast to the very poor, urban working classes and middle 
strata can exercise considerably political pressure on governments, through strikes, protests, and voting.”  
53 With a view to “many developing countries”, Haggard and Kaufman (1989: 245) note that “public employees constitute 
an extremely powerful political force”, whose interests are directly challenged by many stabilization and structural ad-
justment policies, “including fiscal and wage restraint, and the privatization of state-owned enterprises”. These public 
employees, in addition, cannot only overtly resist reforms by mobilizing on the streets, but – given that they form the 
bureaucracy in charge of implementing reforms – they can also undermine reform efforts from within the state (Hag-
gard and Kaufman 1989: 245–248).  
54 “Their responses are shaped by calculations of both short- and longer-run costs and benefits, reflecting both their 
appraisal of economic prospects and their ties with and confidence in the political institutions that affect their likely 
shares in future benefits.” (Nelson 1992: 249) 
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defensive mobilization but are still vulnerable to periodic repression and lack secure access 
to decision making or clear rights to organize.” (Haggard and Kaufman 1989: 225–226)55 
In a more dynamic sense, the question of labor resistance is also shaped by the question of whether 
governments attempting to implement stabilization and adjustment programs are willing and 
capable of negotiating “social pacts, including understandings concerning wage and price policy 
and other issues of macroeconomic policy”, or, at least, of making concessions to and reaching 
agreements with key labor unions in order to divide and weaken labor opposition (Haggard and 
Kaufman 1989: 226). 
This variation notwithstanding, the success of labor opposition to the economic reforms of the 
1980s and early 1990s in Latin America and beyond has relatively uniformly been limited. Nelson 
(1992: 249), for instance, concludes that unions “are seldom strong enough to threaten entire ad-
justment programs, although they can certainly raise the costs to the government of specific 
measures”. At times, unions “may win limited concessions”, but it is only in cases in which “union 
opposition combines with much broader protest, most commonly from the urban popular sectors 
but sometimes also from business” that adjustment programs “have indeed been drastically modi-
fied or abandoned” (Nelson 1990c: 350). In a similar vein, Barbara Geddes (1995: 65) summarizes 
that, generally speaking, “the urban working class has not been able to defend its interests, even in 
fully democratic countries governed by parties elected with working-class support”.56 This also 
holds for countries – such as Argentina – “with strong, autonomous, well-organized working clas-
ses” and in which the working class was “an important constituency of the ruling party” (Geddes 
1995: 65). In various cases, organized labor has been able to mobilize significant strikes and 
demonstrations; in some (including in Uruguay and Brazil), such popular opposition succeeded in 
blocking specific reform measures such as “privatization and cuts in spending”; in many countries, 
“various elements of the standard package have been slowed down or abandoned, but the whole-
sale abandonment of the policies has been rare” (Geddes 1995: 66).57 Reiterating Nelson’s finding, 
Geddes concludes “that organized labor by itself is not powerful enough to hinder adjustment or 
protect itself from bearing substantial costs. It needs the support of the rest of the urban sector” 
(Geddes 1995: 67).58 
On a different note, Haggard and Webb (1994b: 17) observe that, in the cases of “successful ad-
justment” by democratic governments, organized labor was normally somehow integrated into the 
                                                 
55 In Latin America, the military regimes of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay during the 1970s are examples of the 
first configuration, Mexico and Venezuela during the 1980s represent the second type, and Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil 
and Uruguay during the 1980s correspond to the third pattern (see Haggard and Kaufman 1989: 225–226). Comparing 
Mexico (incorporation of organized labor by the governing party) and Argentina (organized labor associated to the 
main opposition party) during the early 1980s, Kahles (1985) makes a roughly similar argument, as does Gibson (1997) 
in his comparison of Mexico under Salinas (1988–1994) and Argentina under Menem (since 1989).  
56 Geddes (1995), here, refers to a sample of eleven countries (Argentina, Brazil, Greece, Mexico, Nigeria, Senegal, Spain, 
Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zambia). 
57 Yet, organized labor may still significantly shape the content of structural adjustment reforms, as a study that combines 
two case studies (on South Korea and Bolivia) with a large-N study covering IMF programs from 1980 to 2000 in 120 
countries worldwide suggests (Caraway et al. 2012). The authors find “that democratic countries with stronger domes-
tic labor receive less intrusive labor-related conditions in their IMF loan programs”. Based on this evidence, they sug-
gest that “that governments concerned about workers’ opposition to labor-related loan conditions [successfully] nego-
tiate with the IMF to minimize labor conditionality” (Caraway et al. 2012: 27). Theoretically in line with the logic of 
Putnam’s two-level game (Putnam 1988; see also Evans et al. 1993), they argue that governments use the (expected) 
opposition to reforms by powerful labor organizations “as bargaining chips” in the negotiations with the IMF (Caraway 
et al. 2012: 28). The finding, however, only holds for democratic regimes, confirming the causal role of regime type in 
terms of enabling and constraining domestic dynamics: “Democratically elected governments will negotiate with the 
IMF on behalf of powerful domestic labor even during times of crises [….]” (Caraway et al. 2012: 28–29). 
58 In the case of Argentina, hyperinflation and its flipside – the successful reduction in inflation rates through drastic 
monetary stabilization measures – were key in guaranteeing widespread popular support for President Carlos Menem 
(Geddes 1995: 67). 
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political system, through its relations with the government and/or political parties, “in ways that 
provide the basis for compromise, social pacts, and enhanced credibility”:59 
“By contrast, where labor had weak links with the government, but strong ties with class-
based leftist or populist parties or movements […] reform proved more difficult.” (Haggard 
and Webb 1994b: 18) 
If the role of organized labor is, thus, already limited, the rest of the popular sectors (informal 
urban sectors, rural workers and peasants) are generally considered to be mostly marginal to the 
processes of adopting and implementing neoliberal reforms. The only exception concerns their 
disruptive potential, as exemplified in the so-called “IMF riots” (see Section 7).60 In contrast, 
Frances Fox Piven and Lorraine Minnite (2015) emphasize the role of the “politics of the poor” in 
the struggles over economic reforms. Empirically focusing on experiences from Latin America, 
they argue that poor peoples’ protests against the IMF and neoliberal reforms since the 1980s had 
in fact a significant policy impact: Even if they did not succeed in preventing the implementation 
of the reforms as such, they forced governments across the region to introduce income support (or 
cash transfer) programs, “with the approval of the IMF and the World Bank” (Piven and Minnite 
2015: 153).61 This dynamic, which points to the relevance of contentious politics (see Section 7), 
has resulted from “three-way contests pitting the IMF and its structural adjustment policies against 
national governments who in turn were besieged by increasingly unruly protestors and the elec-
toral upsets they threatened” (Piven and Minnite 2015: 155–156). Piven and Minnite (2015: 158) 
also highlight the enabling role of the political context, arguing that “these remarkable achieve-
ments” of the politics of the poor in Latin America were possible thanks to “an institutional con-
text that, however imperfectly, still allowed for a measure of democratic accountability through 
electoral-representative institutions.” This, again, points to the relevance of regime type as an ena-
bling (and constraining) factor for the adoption and implementation of economic reforms. 
A different argument on the role of the informal and poor sectors of society has been made with a 
view to Latin America’s “populist” or “neopopulist” presidents that implemented harsh stabiliza-
tion and structural adjustment programs (most notably, Carlos Menem in Argentina and Alberto 
Fujimori in Peru). Here, the political appeal to the “unorganized, largely poor people in the infor-
mal sector” (Weyland 1996: 10), which was materially sustained by the successful fight against 
hyperinflation and, in part, by targeted anti-poverty measures, constituted a key ingredient in the 
construction of electorally successful and relatively durable pro-neoliberal coalitions (see also Gib-
son 1997; Weyland 2002).  
Regarding (4) the role of configurations of social forces or social structures, scholars mostly agree 
that social structures are relevant when it comes to economic reforms. Yet, just as in the cases of 
international pressures and political regime type (see above), socio-structural characteristics enable 
and constrain, but do not determine, specific coalitions that underpin regimes, governments or 
specific policies (see Haggard 1990: 3–4). As Remmer (1986: 3) has argued, for instance, “the ca-
pacity of popular sector groups to sabotage stabilization measures” is clearly conditioned by the 
“level of industrial development and structure of trade unionism”. In a later study (Remmer 1998), 
she found that economic structure – and namely the share of exports relative to GDP – also mat-
                                                 
59 But see Haggard and Kaufman (1995: 203–204) and Pop-Eleches (2009: 176–189) for brief accounts of the crackdown 
on labor unions in Bolivia that permitted the enforcement of far-reaching neoliberal reforms in Bolivia under Paz Es-
tenssoro after 1985. In the case of Argentina (after 1985), indeed, president Menem used the Peronist ties with orga-
nized labor to prevent “general strikes or other broad forms of union protest” (Haggard and Kaufman 1995: 206). 
60 “The urban informal sector has constituted a powerful constraint on policy reform in a number of countries because of 
the threat of rioting, but in general, those segments of the labor force that are presumed to benefit most from structural 
adjustment measures, including rural workers and smallholders and underemployed informal sector workers, are diffi-
cult to mobilize politically.” (Haggard and Kaufman 1989: 224; see also Nelson 1992) 
61 For the specific issue of energy subsidy reforms, an IMF study highlights as a key lesson learnt (from the protest-driven 
failure of reform attempts): “Well-targeted measures to mitigate the impact of energy price increases on the poor are 
critical for building public support for subsidy reforms.” (Alleyne et al. 2013b: 36). 
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ters because it affects the political weight of export-oriented (pro-neoliberal) business interests. 
Still, as Haggard (1990: 3) has argued, the “undeniable” influence of (configurations of) social forc-
es on economic policy-making “is always mediated by institutional setting”.62 This mediated influ-
ence was already discussed above (in the section on societal actors and (interest) groups). 
Regarding (5) ideational factors, scholars emphasize the role of ideas, ideologies, perceptions and 
learning processes. As already mentioned, for instance, Nelson (1990b) has argued that it is not an 
economic crisis per se that matters, but “interpretations and assessments” of this crisis (Nelson 
1990b: 21) as well as the related “perception of the need for far-reaching reforms” (Nelson 1990b: 
32). The policies that are adopted in response to such a crisis, which are in part based on the les-
sons that are drawn from the failure of previous policies, are similarly not the simple result of “ob-
jective” facts but defined and evaluated through the lenses of particular ideological frameworks. In 
this sense, for instance, Haggard has emphasized the role of “economic ideologies” that are availa-
ble, at a given point in time, to those state elites that decide on economic policies (Haggard 1990: 
46) – ideologies, which “originate among professional economists and policy analysts and are 
transmitted internationally through international organizations, bilateral aid missions, and the 
training of professional economists and domestically through universities, research centers, and 
think tanks” (Haggard 1990: 46–47). In this sense, as already noted above, Kendall Stiles (1990: 
972) has observed that “the IMF ‘ideology’” has been very influential in shaping adjustment poli-
cies during the 1980s even when the IMF itself was not directly involved. 
The study by Teri Caraway and colleagues (2012) also lends support to the role of government 
ideology: Leftist governments (in democratic countries) are more likely to come with less intrusive 
labor-market reform conditions, when compared with right/center governments, and the extent to 
which labor power reduces labor-related conditionality is also stronger under leftist governments 
(Caraway et al. 2012: 51). 
Karen Remmer, in her statistical analysis of neoliberal reforms in South America between 1980 
and 1994, finds that the extent of “electoral support for leftist presidential candidates” comes with 
a lower probability that orthodox reforms will be initiated (1998: 18). Comparing Argentina, Chile 
and Mexico, Victoria Murillo (2002) points to the role of the “political bias” of privatizing gov-
ernments, which is determined by partisan beliefs (more or less nationalist and state-
interventionist) and partisan constituencies (populist versus right-wing/military), as a key factor 
explaining variation in the implementation of privatization reforms. 
In his comparative study, Grigore Pop-Eleches (2009: 22) finds “that partisan politics do matter 
but that their salience and temporal evolution vary by region”: 
“[I]n Latin America the ideologically polarized reactions to the IMF interventions in the 
1980s were followed by a significant decline in partisanship during the 1990s and renewed 
polarization since 2001. Meanwhile, ideology played a relatively modest role in Eastern Eu-
rope in the 1990s […]. [I]if there exist alternative ideologically based crisis interpretations 
and solutions (such as during the Latin American debt crisis) then partisan differences are 
exacerbated by economic crises.” (Pop-Eleches 2009: 22) 
The key question here concerns the ideological lenses through which economic crisis, its causes 
and potential solutions are perceived and interpreted and whether respective perceptions and in-
terpretations contribute to ideological convergence across partisan divides or rather exacerbate 
polarization.63 In sum, Pop-Eleches (2009: 234) emphasizes “the complex interactions between 
                                                 
62 “In some developing countries political elites have inherited or built organizational structures that significantly con-
strain the ability of societal actors to achieve their political and economic objectives.” (Haggard 1990: 3) 
63 “In Latin America left and right parties had similar reform inclinations during periods of relative economic stability 
(low inflation, solid growth) but experienced policy divergence in reaction to inflationary and recessionary crises, 
which made right-leaning governments more likely to initiate reforms but had not impact on the left. By contrast, East-
ern Europe experienced crisis-driven partisan policy convergence […].” (Pop-Eleches 2009: 170) 
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economic crises, ideological preferences, domestic power relations, and institutional constraints 
shaping the trajectory of IMF program initiation and implementation”.  
6. CHARACTERISTICS, DETERMINANTS AND DYNAMICS OF NEGOTIATION PROCESSES  
Generally speaking, the existing scholarship reviewed so far suggests that the actual negotiation of 
the reform policies (in a narrow sense) was very much concentrated in the executive branch of 
government, with participation from international experts and domestic technocrats from within 
and without the state apparatus. The key negotiation “partners” were the external donors and cred-
itors (IFIs, bilateral donors and commercial banks). If discussed at all, parliaments are primarily 
mentioned as potential stumbling blocks that constrain or entirely thwart executive reform initia-
tives. Societal actors such as, most notably, labor and business organizations do play a role, but 
rather as actors that, from outside the policy process, mobilize to defend certain specific interests 
or lobby for some particular demand, without being systematically included in the design or im-
plementation of the economic reforms (see Haggard and Kaufman 1992a; Nelson 1990a). For the 
cases of Argentina and Brazil during the 1980s, for instance, Kaufman summarizes that “legisla-
tures had little technical staff support, lacked clearly defined decision-making procedures, and 
were uncertain of their role vis-à-vis the executive branch”, while “[o]rganized labor and business 
groups also had a minimal input into executive decision making, in part as a result of their own 
internal divisions and in part because government officials were reluctant to ‘tie their own hands’ 
by widening the circle of participants in the decision-making process” (Kaufman 1990: 75). 
The scholarship that explicitly deals with the international negotiation of stabilization and struc-
tural adjustment reforms – and which mainly focuses on the negotiation of IMF programs – gen-
erally confirms this overall finding (see Kahler 1993; Stiles 1987, 1990). The key notion, here, is 
Putnam’s two-level game, that is, an analytical perspective that sees the government (or the chief of 
government) of a given country simultaneously negotiating with an external actor (say, the IMF) 
and dealing with domestic politics at home (that is, being pressured by domestic groups and insti-
tutions, trying to construct coalitions to secure support etc.) (see Putnam 1988; Evans et al. 1993). 
This two-level configuration of international negotiations puts governments in a privileged posi-
tion. On the one hand, “[c]entral executives have a special role in mediating domestic and interna-
tional pressures precisely because they are directly exposed to both spheres” (Putnam 1988: 432). 
On the other, they can use both domestic constraints in order to manipulate international negotia-
tions and international pressures in order to manipulate domestic constraints (see Evans et al. 
1993).64 This is far from saying that governments will simply have their way, but that they have 
significant agency and are, at times, able to shape both the process of negotiations and the sub-
stance of the agreements in ways that are surprising given the highly asymmetric (power) structure 
of the negotiations at hand (see Stiles 1987, 1990).65 Vis-á-vis the IMF, this room for maneuver 
obviously is also shaped by the geopolitical logics and the international economic and political 
weight and role of the country at hand, as has been mentioned in Section 4 (see also Pop-Eleches: 
105–145). Domestically, the question whether IMF pressure will help or harm governments in 
their attempt to justify and enforce unpopular reform policies will depend, in particular, on the 
issues of perception, ideology and partisan politics discussed in Section 5.66 In sum, therefore, gov-
ernments that negotiate painful reforms with the IMF are – on the one hand – in the privileged 
position of being able to play external and domestic actors off against each other. On the other 
                                                 
64 An example of the former was already mentioned in footnote 57 in Section 5: As Caraway et al. (2012: 28) argue in line 
with the logic of a two-level game, governments use the (expected) opposition to reforms by powerful labor organiza-
tions “as bargaining chips” in the negotiations with the IMF. 
65 For the case of Argentina, Stiles (1987) suggests that the elected government was fairly successful in shaping the con-
tent of the IMF program, even if in the end policies were adopted that largely corresponded to IMF recipes. 
66 When, for instance, IMF programs are perceived as “thinly disguised impositions of Western economic interests by 
significant portions of the elite and the population” (Pop-Eleches 2009: 172), governments can hardly expect that refer-
ences to IMF pressure will help them domestically. 
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hand, however, they are in the particularly difficult position that they have “to walk a fine line 
between domestic priorities and the requirements of IMF conditionality” (Pop-Eleches 2009: 
134).67 
Furthermore, this scholarship also confirms that it would be misleading to view governments as 
unitary actors. This is not only the case because individual members of government may represent 
and/or respond to different ideological views, partisan positions and/or societal interests that exist 
in the country at hand. What is more, as Kahler has argued, 
“[…] By far the most significant coalition-building by the IMF is the construction of trans-
national alliances with technocrats in government ministries that share IMF policy prefer-
ences, typically the finance ministry and the central bank. These ministries, responsible for 
macroeconomic and budgetary oversight, are often in agreement with the prescriptions of 
the IMF, whose programs provide them with valuable ammunition. The career paths of 
these technocrats have also predisposed them toward transnational alignment with the IFIs, 
since many have spent time as staff members at one of them. The Fund and the Bank also 
attempt to create such interlocutors and allies in the longer run through programs of tech-
nical assistance […].” (Kahler 1993: 377)68 
The notion of a negotiation game with different, neatly distinguishable levels and actors is, there-
fore, overly simplistic, even when focusing on the official part of the negotiations that take place 
between IMF staff and a specific government. When broadening the perspective and looking at the 
diverse set of negotiation processes that surround the design, the initiation and the implementa-
tion of economic reform, we have to include the whole range of context conditions and structures, 
actors and dynamics that have been discussed in the previous sections. 
7. “IMF RIOTS” AND “AUSTERITY PROTESTS” 
Given the fact that IMF-supported stabilization and adjustment programs brought (and continue 
to produce) immediately tangible social hardships for the popular sectors in general and organized 
labor in particular,69 it comes with little surprise that they frequently provoked (and continue to 
provoke) significant resistance “from below” (see Moosa and Moosa 2019: 89–110; Nelson 1992: 
245–253; Walton 1989; Walton and Ragin 1990; Walton and Seddon 1994).70 
“Since the mid-1970s, an international wave of price riots, strikes, and political demonstra-
tions has swept across the developing world in a pattern at once historically unprecedented 
and reminiscent of classical food riots best documented in European social history. Modern 
                                                 
67 More specifically, “governments have to strike a delicate balance between their own economic and ideological agenda, 
the demands of IMF conditionality, and the domestic political and institutional feasibility of neoliberal reform blue-
prints” (Pop-Eleches 2009: 135). 
68 However, the IMF itself is also not a unitary actor either but characterized by its own “domestic politics” (see Kahler 
1993: 365–369). See also Pop-Eleches (2009: 105–134), which, inter alia, includes brief case studies on Argentina, Boliv-
ia, Peru and Chile. 
69 See, for instance, Walton and Ragin (1990: 877): “The urban poor and the working class are affected by a combination 
of subsidy cuts, real wage reductions, and price increases stemming from devaluations and the elimination of public 
services. A reduced share of national income for labor and greater income inequality are frequently documented ill ef-
fects. Domestic price increases may benefit rural producers, depending on their size and their degree of dependence on 
imports. The middle classes are hurt, especially public employees who face the elimination of their jobs. Consumer 
prices rise, and shopkeepers’ sales volume suffers from diminished demand.” 
70 “The term ‘IMF riots’ was coined to describe waves of protests witnessed by developing countries throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s, when many of them were in crisis and had to resort to borrowing from the IMF.“ (Moosa and Moosa 2019: 
89) As John Walton already emphasized in 1989, the notion of “IMF riots” oversimplifies more complex stories be-
cause “the IMF was not the only exponent of austerity, and protest was directed at additional institutions both within 
and outside the realm of public policy”: “The IMF had a heavy hand in global policy making, but it also provided a 
convenient symbol that exaggerated its responsibility.” Strong external pressures notwithstanding, “austerity policies 
were not unilaterally dictated or imposed by the IMF, the banks, or by the U.S. government”. In addition, “the protests 
took other forms in addition to riots” (Walton 1989: 309). Instead of “IMF riots”, Walton and Seddon (1994), for in-
stance, talk about “food riots” and “austerity protests”. 
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protests, however, are fundamentally a product of the international political economy.” 
(Walton and Seddon 1994: 23) 
While Walton and Seddon, in this quote, talk about “food riots”, the overarching concept is “aus-
terity protests”, which are defined as “large-scale collective actions including political demonstra-
tions, general strikes, and riots, which are animated by grievances over state policies of economic 
liberalization implemented in response to the debt crisis and market reforms urged by internation-
al agencies” (1994: 39). 
Key questions that are addressed by this scholarship and will be discussed in this section include: 
(1) (When) Do IMF programs and/or austerity measures provoke protest?  
(2) Which features and dynamics characterize anti-IMF/austerity protests?  
(3) What are the consequences of anti-IMF/austerity protests?71 
Regarding the question of (1) IMF programs and austerity measures as causes of protest, Joan 
Nelson summarized in 1992 that most stabilization and adjustment programs “have been accom-
panied by some strike action” (Nelson 1992: 245). In addition, “increased prices (reduced or re-
moved subsidies) for foods, utilities, gasoline, or bus fares” frequently triggered urban protests, but 
large protests have been “a comparatively rare response” (Nelson 1992: 249–250). In 1990, Walton 
and Ragin observed that “a wave of austerity protest has occurred in 26 of the approximately 80 
debtor countries” (Walton and Ragin 1990: 877); in 1994, this share had risen to “39 of the approx-
imately 80 debtor countries” (Walton and Seddon 1994: 42). 
This variation raises the question of when or under which circumstances adjustment measures 
provoke (large-scale) urban protest. In 1992, Nelson noted that there was still “almost no systemat-
ic analysis of the factors determining occurrence versus nonoccurrence of protests” (Nelson 1992: 
250).72 An exception is John Walton and Charles Ragin’s study of protests in debtor countries 
between 1975 and 1986, which analyzed 26 protest and 34 non-protest countries (Walton and 
Ragin 1992).73 This study found that the key conditions explaining the occurrence and the severity 
of austerity protests are “overurbanization” and the involvement of the IMF (“IMF pressure”). In 
the statistical analysis, additionally, the “severity of debt” and two “hardship variables” (inflation 
and high consumer prices) significantly correlate with the presence of protest (Walton and Ragin 
1992: 883–884).74 Their qualitative analysis of ten countries that combine the “highest scores on 
both protest severity and overurbanization”75 shows that these cases are characterized by “a high 
degree of urban social organization, particularly in working class communities” (886). In these 
cases, “the particularly explosive combination” therefore lies “in the depredations of austerity poli-
                                                 
71 The scholarship on “anti-IMF”, “austerity” or “anti-neoliberal” protests is, of course, very extensive – in particular, 
when it comes to individual cases. In the context of this working paper, I can only discuss a rather small selection of 
comparative studies that fit with the overall topic at hand. 
72 Based on available evidence, she instead speculates that “at least five sets of factors” may be at work here, including the 
“short-term economic impact of adjustment measures”, the “degree to which degree much of the public is convinced 
that the economy is in dire straits and strong policies are required to restore stability and growth”, “confidence in the 
government’s plan or competence to manage the economy”, “the legitimacy and popularity of the government or, con-
versely, linkage with other grievances” as well as “government tactics” (Nelson 1992: 250–251). In general, looking 
broadly at strikes, protests, and electoral behavior, she highlights specifically one “broad principle” that seems to sus-
tain “political acquiescence” of the popular sectors in spite of harmful measures: “confidence – more precisely, the be-
lief that the government in power has the will and capacity to cope with current economic difficulties and to lay the ba-
sis for resumed growth” (Nelson 1992: 258). 
73 The “protest debtor countries” include several Latin American countries but also, e.g., Egypt and Tunisia. 
74 A study on austerity protests in Argentina and Mexico between 1990 and 1990 comes to roughly similar results (Shef-
ner et al. 2006). 
75 These countries include Egypt and Tunisia as well as Peru, Chile, Bolivia, Brazil, Dominican Republic, and Argentina. 
Recapitulating this analysis, Walton and Seddon (1994: 44–45) summarize: “If the countries that have had austerity 
protests are rank-ordered on both protest severity and overurbanization, the top ten cases are: Peru, Chile, Bolivia, Tu-
nisia, Morocco, Egypt, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Argentina, and Zambia. We suggest that the mechanism linking 
overurbanization and protest is a well-developed organizational infrastructure capable of mobilizing political action. 
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cies visited upon the urban poor who are already organized and oriented to political action” (887). 
In sum, the authors conclude: 
“Countries with large, poor urban populations experience protests when governments im-
pose policies with regressive social class consequences in the interest of servicing foreign 
debts.” (Walton and Ragin 1992: 887)76 
In Free Markets and Food Riots, John Walton and David Seddon expand this analysis of “the rela-
tionship between widespread popular unrest in the cities of the developing world […] and the 
process of economic and social transformation – associated with a renewed emphasis on liberaliza-
tion and the promotion of ‘free markets’ – that has taken place on a global scale over the last two 
decades” (1994: 3). The key argument developed in this book is that popular protest should be 
understood “as a more general social and political response to the systematic undermining of pre-
vious economic and social structures and of an earlier moral order, in the name of ‘adjustment’” 
(Walton and Seddon 1994: 3). When it comes to explaining “the origins, timing, and changing 
forms of food riots”, the authors identify four general theoretical approaches, which they regard as 
complementary: “rational response, moral economy, community, and state and market” (30). In 
sum, they argue: 
“The key links between international demands, state action, and protest include: an 
‘overurbanized’ or large urban population not absorbed in formal sector and industrial em-
ployment and so more likely to experience the pains of austerity; cities that are socially and 
politically organized in a strong civil society (e.g. in unions, political groups, community as-
sociations, churches); and a moral economy that provides ideological legitimation for popu-
lar protest based on the social pact previously negotiated by developmental regimes.” (Wal-
ton and Seddon 1994: 54)77 
An additional analysis focused on Latin America confirms that “IMF conditionality, hardship, 
urbanization, and unionization” best predict the emergence of austerity protests (Walton and 
Shefner 1994: 115), suggesting “that international interventions in Latin American societies in the 
form of austerity programs combine with domestic structures that make vulnerable large numbers 
of people who are already organized in urban communities” (118).78 
In a large-N study covering 70 developing countries in 1981–1989, Juha Auvinen (1996) has sys-
tematically investigated the effects of IMF-supported stabilization and adjustment programs on the 
extent of political protest (demonstrations, riots and strikes).79 Theoretically, he distinguishes be-
tween two causal mechanisms: IMF intervention can (a) cause political protest by provoking an 
“instant reaction” on the part of those negatively affected by the austerity measures (“trigger ef-
fect”) and/or it can (b) cause protest if the measures adopted have negative consequences on eco-
nomic performance (“economic effect”). The latter mechanism can, however, also have the oppo-
site effect of reducing protest, if an IMF intervention improves economic performance (Auvinen 
                                                 
76 Based on a qualitative comparison of austerity protests in Latin America since the mid-1970s, Walton had previously 
developed the following “working hypothesis: the incidence of austerity protest is associated with a combination of 
hardship and the potential for mobilization (i.e., urbanization and unionization), but not with conventional political 
and economic variables [i.e., regime type or level of economic development, JW].” (Walton 1989: 315) 
77 “State and market theory applies to these developments and provides an explanation for the timing and form of the 
new cross-national wave of austerity protest. Moral economy gives meaning to the abrogation of the social pact estab-
lished between developmentalist regimes and rapidly urbanizing populations. Structural adjustment eliminates precise-
ly those resources that support patron-client arrangements in which the political loyalty of the masses is negotiated for 
subsistence guarantees. Community theories, finally, capture the link between hyperurbanization, urban social organi-
zation, and the civil society that carries on, and reinterprets, traditional moral economy. Each of the theories provides a 
key ingredient, but all of them need to be reformulated in a new synthesis. Popular protest is fashioned in civil society 
by groups struggling, on the one hand, to mobilize on the basis of culturally defined rights. State and culture provide 
the general elements of a theory of collective action.” (Walton and Seddon 1994: 54) 
78 For the MENA region, see Walton and Seddon (1994: 171–214). 
79 Auvinen (1996: 379–381) also briefly summarizes the state of research on anti-IMF/austerity protests, which had so far 
failed to provide conclusive evidence on the association between IMF intervention and political protest.  
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1996: 381–382). Empirically, Auvinen finds that IMF programs matter for political conflict, but not 
in a straightforward and uniform manner. On the one hand, his statistical analysis suggests that 
IMF-supported stabilization and adjustment programs provoke protest (1) in countries with very 
few or a long history of IMF agreements, (2) in countries with relatively high levels of urbanization 
and economic development and (3) in countries with democratic (or only moderately authoritari-
an) political regimes.80 On the other hand, the finding that the relative amount of IMF credit (in 
percentage of GNP) is negatively associated with political protest suggests that the Fund “may have 
helped governments stave off protest by bringing them additional resources to implement the 
necessary economic reforms” (Auvinen 1996: 391). 
Comparing 17 Latin American countries between 1980 and 2007, Béjar and Ortiz (2013) have 
examined the relationship between IMF programs and contentious collective action (riots, demon-
strations, and strikes). Inter alia, they find “that the likelihood of contentious collective action 
increases by a substantial 38% when Latin American countries sign agreements with the IMF, even 
when controlling for all other factors” (505). Given that this effect of signing an IMF agreement 
remains significant even when controlling for the adoption of austerity measures, the authors con-
clude that it is not so much the (expected) grievances that drive contentious action, but the percep-
tion that the government is “selling out” the country to international agents (508). In addition, 
however, economic growth also appears to (negatively) affect contentious collective action (505). 
In another paper based on a roughly similar sample (16 Latin American democracies between 1982 
and 2007), Béjar and Moraes (2016) find that IMF programs do not per se provoke protest but that 
this effect is mediated by the party system. More specifically, their statistical analysis confirms “that 
the level of protest [provoked by IMF programs] decreases in recipient countries when the level of 
party system institutionalization is high” (Béjar and Moraes 2016: 26). 
In terms of (2) the characteristics and dynamics of austerity protests, Walton and Shefner (1994) 
identify a series of common (or typical) features that characterize the experiences from Latin 
America since the mid-1970s: 
“Typically, austerity protests were precipitated by drastic, overnight price hikes resulting 
from the termination of public subsidies on basic goods and services, proclaimed by the 
government as regrettably necessary reforms urged by the IMF and international lenders as 
conditions for new and renegotiated loans.” (Walton and Shefner 1994: 106) 
“The protests took place predominantly in cities, and spread through national urban net-
works, reflecting the locus of austerity reforms. […] Although protest typically multiplies 
through a network of cities, it usually begins in the capital where mobilization is easier and 
government targets are at hand. […] The spread of protest demonstrations is often rapid 
and spontaneous as news of violence in the capital reaches provincial cities.” (108) 
“The spatial distribution of protest mirrors the location of aggrieved groups: the urban poor 
whose subsidized food and transportation are eliminated, industrial workers and civil serv-
ants who lose jobs in state budget cuts, university students whose educational subsidies are 
cut.” (108–109)81 
                                                 
80 “From low to middle levels of authoritarianism, the extent of political protest is higher when Fund-supported 
conditional policies are implemented than when they are not. Subsequently the extent of protest decreases much faster 
under the Fund’s intervention and, at high levels of political authoritarianism, political protest is less extensive in the 
presence of IMF intervention than without. Severely repressive regimes seem to have succeeded better than democratic 
regimes in keeping at bay political protest during Fund programmes.” (Auvinen 1996: 392) 
81 “Conversely, one of the objectives of structural adjustment is to stimulate agricultural production and export through 
higher prices. Instances of rural protest are exceptional and where they occur prove the rule owing to their connection 
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“Protests appeared in three distinct forms: strike, demonstration, and riot. […] Under the 
heading of form we should emphasize that austerity protests are bloody affairs, particularly 
when they lead to riot.” (109) 
“The targets of political demonstrations and riot violence reflect a good deal about the mor-
al economy of the Latin crowd. Marches and rallies congregate in the major thoroughfares 
and public plazas. Targets symbolize agents of austerity policy and the international econ-
omy: government buildings, the treasury and national palace, the legislature. […] When 
protests take the form of violent direct action, crowds focus on their immediate grievances 
and local communities. Looting is aimed at supermarkets, clothing and furniture stores, 
gasoline stations, and banks.” (110–111) 
“Participants are characteristically drawn from a limited set of social categories. They are 
mainly the urban poor: slum dwellers, participants in the informal economy, and the un-
employed. But the working class and labor organizations also play a key role. The class 
composition of protestors widens with participants motivated by public-service cuts: stu-
dents, teachers, health-care workers, and other government employees. In some instances, 
other middle-class consumers (e.g. of petroleum) and shopkeepers join demonstrations. 
And occasionally, professional groups ally with broad movements for reform.” (111)82 
From a broader empirical perspective, Walton and Seddon (1994: 42) similarly conclude that 
“[a]usterity protests are overwhelmingly urban actions”: 
“Participants usually include a cross-section of the urban poor (shantytown dwellers, un-
employed youth, street vendors) and working class (unions). In most instances, these low-
income groups are allied with other affected segments of the population: students in Libe-
ria, teachers in Guatemala, public employees in Bolivia, shopkeepers in the Dominican Re-
public, and professional groups from physicians to pilots in Sudan. Middle-class consumers 
have supported demonstrations in Chile and business organizations were part of the oppo-
sition in the Philippines. Church groups and Christian base-community organizations have 
coordinated protests in a number of Latin American countries. Once mass discontent is 
made evident by these coalitions, political parties may take up the anti-austerity cause in 
successful bids for national office (e.g. Peru, Dominican Republic).” (Walton and Seddon 
1994: 43–44; see also Walton and Ragin 1990: 877) 
In terms of social classes, Joan Nelson (1992) has emphasized that it is usually not the very poor 
that engage in resistance, but mainly the relatively privileged segments of the popular sectors (the 
urban working and middle classes), which are better off than the very poor but suffer larger relative 
losses from economic crises, austerity and adjustment measures. 
When it comes to (3) the consequences of austerity protests, it is important to distinguish between 
different dimensions: Protests, on the one hand, may have specific effects on the (non-
)implementation of the very economic reforms but they, on the other, can also have broader con-
sequences for social conflict, economic and political development in the country at hand. 
Touching upon both dimensions, Walton and Shefner (1994) summarize the experiences from 
Latin America until the early 1990s: 
“The effects of protest are varied and combined with other domestic currents, ranging from 
negligible impacts on stalwart regimes (e.g. Chile) to collapse (e.g. Haiti), electoral succes-
sion (e.g. Peru), and hastened return to democratic rule (e.g. Argentina, Brazil). In many in-
stances popular movements have exerted pressure on states to temporize adjustment pro-
grams and demand more favorable debt-relief arrangements from multilateral agencies 
                                                 
82 Furthermore, Walton and Shefner note that the church “has played an active part in political demonstrations and local 
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such as the International Monetary Fund. The IMF, banks, and advanced-country govern-
ments, in turn, have been forced to weigh the trade-offs between stringent repayment 
schedules and political instability in friendly debtor countries.” (Walton and Shefner 1994: 
99–100) 
Looking more systematically at the effects of austerity protests in Latin America, Walton and Shef-
ner note that, first, “a number of protests have had no appreciable effect – at least no effect on 
ameliorating hardship”, either because protests were simply repressed (as in Chile under Pinochet) 
or because limited concessions were temporarily granted to calm protests (Walton and Shefner 
1994: 129). In a second set of cases, protests effectively “reduced the overall scope of the austerity 
package”, by forcing governments “to compensate for cost-of-living increases with higher wages 
(e.g. Jamaica, Ecuador), public works and employment stimulation (Chile, Brazil), and price freez-
es (Guatemala)” (129). In a few cases (such as Haiti, Brazil, and Argentina), third, “austerity pro-
tests contributed directly and indirectly to regime shifts” (130; see also Walton 1989: 320–326). 
In terms of the specific consequences of protests on the implementation of economic reforms, an 
internal IMF review that analyzed the completion rate of IMF-supported structural adjustment 
programs between 1986 and 1997 found that 51 programs (three quarters) where characterized by 
“significant interruptions”, with 1/6 of these interruptions stemming “from severe political 
upheavales that called into question the authority of the government to negotiate or provide a 
credible commitment to a program” (IMF 2001: 55).83 This implies that in most of the cases, mass 
protests were not a key cause seriously obstructing the implementation of IMF programs. Focusing 
on the role of organized labor, Joan Nelson comes to a roughly similar conclusion:  
“Among the urban popular classes, unionized labor is usually best-organized to defend its 
interests, and strikes are widely assumed to be the most likely cause of the erosion or aban-
donment of adjustment programs. Most stabilization and adjustment programs have been 
accompanied by some strike action. Yet there are very few instances where union pressure 
alone derailed adjustment efforts, although labor combined with other elements of the ur-
ban popular sectors has done so in some instances.” (Nelson 1992: 245) 
The problem, according to Nelson (1992), is that “unions in developing countries are not strong” 
(246) and, in addition, they “tend to be fragmented and often poorly led” (247). Organized labor, 
therefore, “has usually not been powerful enough to prevent falling wages and growing unem-
ployment, nor to forestall a shrinking factor share of national income” (247). As already men-
tioned in Section 5, Nelson concludes that unions “are seldom strong enough to threaten entire 
adjustment programs, although they can certainly raise the costs to the government of specific 
measures” (249). In line with this last point, the above-mentioned study by Teri Caraway et al. 
(2012), which includes protest as a key mechanism of organized labor’s political influence, finds 
that powerful labor organizations have an impact on negotiations with the IMF in the sense that 
they tend to reduce the amount of labor-related conditions.84 
Another potential consequence concerns the adoption of compensatory measures in response to 
protest, e.g. in the area of social policy. According to Piven and Minnite (2015), for instance, the 
spread of social (cash transfer) programs across Latin America can be understood as a conse-
quence (or an achievement) of poor peoples’ protests against IMF programs and neoliberal re-
                                                 
83 A particularly contested type of reform, which has frequently triggered successful protests, concerns energy subsidies, 
as a comprehensive IMF study on the topic notes: “The adjustment of prices for subsidized energy has often led to 
widespread public protests by those who benefit from subsidies and to either a complete or partial reversal of price in-
creases” (Alleyne et al. 2013a: 3). 
84 The case study on South Korea, for instance, emphasizes labor unions’ “commitment to mass mobilization throughout 
the negotiations”, which included the mobilization of “120,000 workers in sixteen major cities”, “a two-month sit-in 
strike at Hyundai Motors, a subway worker walkout, and massive mobilizations by finance industry workers in re-
sponse to layoffs” (Caraway et al. 2012: 39). In Bolivia, in contrast, organized labor had lost much of its traditional 
strength when the IMF, in the late 1980s, began pushing for labor market reforms and, therefore, proved “incapable of 
mounting a viable resistance to the reforms proposed by the IMF” (Caraway et al. 2012: 41). 
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forms in the region (see 5.). These achievements, the authors argue, were based on the political 
opportunity structure offered by democratic regimes: 
“In capitalist democracies, elite vulnerability is filtered through electoral-representative ar-
rangements, which is why movements that threaten the stability of electoral and governing 
coalitions have sometimes succeeded in winning state concessions against the predations of 
capitalists.” (Piven and Minnite 2015: 159) 
More generally, this can be said of social programs and social emergency funds that emerged as an 
increasingly common response to (anticipated) popular protests during the 1980s. A case in point 
is Bolivia’s Emergency Social Fund (ESF), a demand-based social fund introduced in 1986 (in the 
context of the drastic stabilization and structural adjustment program initiated in 1985). Accord-
ing to Carol Graham, the ESF “substantially advanced both the political sustainability of economic 
reform and the alleviation of poverty” in Bolivia and became the model “for the implementation of 
safety nets in several countries during the 1980s and 1990s” (Graham 1995: 214, 212). 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
This PRIF Working Paper has reviewed key publications that shed light on the political economy 
and the contentious politics of neoliberal reforms. The focus has been on stabilization and struc-
tural adjustment programs of the 1980s and early 1990s as they were implemented across Latin 
America, but also in other world regions. The discussion, while far from a systematic literature 
review, has revealed a series of important findings. The question of whether and in what way the 
contemporary dynamics – since the global financial crisis of 2008/2009 or in the context and af-
termath of the COVID-19 pandemic – resemble or differ from these not-so-distant experiences, is 
beyond the scope of this paper. However, the diverse empirical findings and theoretical insights 
reported here are certainly helpful to take into account when analyzing current attempts to stabi-
lize and reform crisis-ridden economies around the globe. In this spirit, I want to conclude this 
paper with a few selected and pointed take-away messages: 
 The rough and dichotomous distinction between democratic and authoritarian regimes is not 
particularly useful when trying to explain the adoption and implementation of structural eco-
nomic reforms. The characteristics of political regimes certainly enable, shape and constrain 
struggles over economic reforms. However, both democracies and non-democracies are inter-
nally so diverse (and so many countries are somewhere in-between these two contentious cate-
gories) that more fine-grained and specific conceptual tools are needed (see Section 2).  
 A crucial issue that remains as relevant today as it was 30–40 years ago concerns the interrela-
tionship and the interplay of economic reforms and processes of political (regime) change. One 
key feature, in this regard, concerns the question of sequencing of political and economic re-
forms. Also, both types of reform processes can take the form of a short-term, radical break or 
of a more gradual change process. In Latin America during the 1980s and early 1990s, some of 
the most far-reaching neoliberal adjustment programs were implemented by elected govern-
ments as a kind of “shock therapy” in response to severe financial crises (see Section 3).  
 The contentious adoption and implementation of economic reforms in general, and of neolib-
eral reforms in particular, cannot be understood through a narrow look at the national level. 
External actors – international organizations such as the IMF, foreign governments but also 
private creditors or investors – are very much part of the story and participate in many ways in 
the negotiation of economic reforms. In addition, transnational economic flows and the struc-
ture of the global political economy imply severe constraints and incentives that shape eco-
nomic reforms and reform struggles. Neither external actors nor international structural con-
straints, however, determine economic reforms. Their influence is only indirect, operating 
through the filters established by domestic institutions, hegemonic discourses, and actor con-
figurations (see Section 4). 
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 Even if countries embark on (neoliberal) economic reforms under immense external pressure, 
domestic structures and actors still play a key role in shaping the fate and characteristics of 
economic reforms. Whereas regime type and economic and social structures constrain and en-
able the domestic politics of economic reform in a rather general sense, understanding varia-
tion in policy choice and implementation requires the inclusion of a broad range of institution-
al, actor-centered and ideational factors. As regards key domestic actors, the actual negotiation 
of economic reforms is mostly an elite-centered affair. Non-elite groups and popular-sector or-
ganizations such as organized labor in particular, are far from irrelevant; but their role is mostly 
reactive or defensive and consists in attempts to constrain, block or thwart austerity measures 
and neoliberal reforms (see Section 5). 
 Neoliberal reforms are not imposed by anyone – not by the IMF, not by an individual govern-
ment. In contrast, they emerge from and are continuously shaped by negotiation processes, 
which simultaneously take place at different levels. In these negotiations, national governments 
play a key role and have significant leeway to manipulate and influence these “two-level 
games”. At the same time, however, they have to navigate between often contradictory external 
and domestic demands (see Section 6). 
 Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, in Latin America and beyond, austerity measures, mac-
roeconomic stabilization programs, and neoliberal reforms provoked significant resistance, in 
particular on the part of popular sectors which had to bear the bulk of the social costs of struc-
tural adjustment. Depending on circumstances and dynamics, popular protests did have a 
whole series of consequences. But, generally speaking, resistance failed to prevent the imple-
mentation of economic reforms that, by and large, followed the neoliberal recipe (see Section 
7). This, however, does not tell us that resistance to neoliberal reforms is always and necessarily 
doomed to failure. Certainly, the very notion that there is no alternative to neoliberal reforms is 
part and parcel of the “success story” of neoliberalism during the 1980s and 1990s. But the at-
tempt to challenge such a hegemonic – and historically contingent – notion is precisely what 
protests against neoliberal reforms are all about.  
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